FRANCIS VALDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Francis Valdez was convicted of second-degree grand theft as an aider and abettor after driving a vehicle from which a woman exited with stolen merchandise. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the state failed to prove the specific intent required for aiding and abetting liability based solely on circumstantial evidence.
The court reversed Valdez's conviction, holding that the state failed to prove the specific intent required for aiding and abetting liability. The circumstantial evidence—that Valdez drove the vehicle and was present at the scene—was consistent with innocent conduct and did not prove intent to participate in the crime.
[1] To convict someone as a principal for aiding and abetting a crime, the state must prove that the individual aided or abetted in the commission of the crime and possessed…
[2] Mere knowledge that an offense is being committed is insufficient to establish criminal intent for aiding and abetting.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to convict someone of aiding and abetting in a crime as a principal in the first degree, the state must prove that the individual aided or abetted in the commission of the crime and had the requisite specific intent to participate in the crime.”
Establishes the two-part requirement for aiding and abetting liability: both action and specific intent.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEyewitnesses identified Valdez as the driver of a vehicle parked in a department store fire lane. A woman who had stolen men's shirts from the store e…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of second degree grand theft in violation of section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). Appellant raises three grounds for reversal, one of which is that the circumstantial evidence against him was insufficient as a matter of law. We agree and reverse as to this ground. Accordingly, we need not address the other grounds raised.
Eyewitnesses identified appellant as the driver of a vehicle which sped away from a department store after a woman, who had stolen several men’s shirts from the store, entered the vehicle. Other evidence established that the vehicle which appellant was driving had been parked in the fire lane outside the department store prior to the woman’s entry into the car. As appellant sped away, store detectives forced the vehicle to a stop, whereupon appellant and the woman were arrested. During questioning by police at the time of the arrest, appellant indicated that he had no knowledge of the woman’s intent to steal. Appellant told police that he thought the woman went into the store to buy a dress for their daughter.
The evidence indicated that while appellant and the woman were not married, they did live together and had this one daughter. The state failed to prove that appellant had the specific intent to participate as an aider and abettor in the grand theft. In order to convict someone of aiding and abetting in a crime as a principal in the first degree, the state must prove that the individual aided or abetted in the commission of the crime and had the requisite specific intent to participate in the crime. Collins v. State, 438 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Rich v. State, 413 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
Mere knowledge that an offense is being committed is not the same as participation with criminal intent. Collins, 438 So. 2d at 1038. Mere presence at the scene, including driving the perpetrator to and from the scene or a display of questionable behavior after the fact, is not sufficient to establish participation. Collins; In the Interest of R.W.G. v. State, 395 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence, but if the proof of intent rests solely upon circumstantial evidence, the proof must be not only consistent with the guilt of the accused, but also inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170, 1173 (Fla.1985); Bailey v. State, 442 So. 2d 385, 386-387 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Lockett, 262 So. 2d at 254.
The state failed to carry its burden in the case at bar. It merely demonstrated that appellant was the driver of the vehicle that the woman entered after she stole the shirts. Appellant’s actions could be explained in a manner consistent with innocence, i.e., appellant waited in the car while the woman went to purchase a dress for their daughter. The store detectives testified that it was not unusual for customers to park in the fire lanes while another person went inside the store to make purchases.
For the foregoing reasons, and upon the authority of the cases cited, appellant’s judgment and sentence is reversed.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Cited By (20 total)
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McLEAN v. State, 754 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…y circumstantial evidence, “if the proof of intent rests solely upon circumstantial evidence, the proof must not only be consistent with guilt of the accused, but also inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Valdez v. State, 504 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). In this case, the State’s evidence is not inconsistent with appellant’s assertion that he was not aware of Raneourt’s intention to kidnap the victim. The fact that appellant moved the car after the victim was taken from the c…
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Salter v. State, 77 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…d 328, 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “‘Mere presence at the scene, including driving the perpetrator to and from the scene or a display of questionable behavior after the fact, is not sufficient to establish participation.’ ” Id. (quoting Valdez v. State, 504 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)). The elements of aiding and abetting — assisting the actual perpetrator in some way and intent to participate — “may be proven by a combination of surrounding circumstances from which a jury can reasonably infer a defendant’s…
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A.D. v. State, 106 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…riven it off the property. A.D. did not commit theft because he did not exercise dominion or control over the van at any point. See id. Additionally, A.D.’s after-the-crash behavior fails to establish participation in the theft. See Valdez v. State, 504 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Thus, the State failed to present evidence inconsistent with A.D.’s hypothesis of innocence that, after trespassing on the Delar-as’ property and helping M.P., he became frightened and fled, subsequently making the bad decisi…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnnell Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Wilton Amos Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985)
- Pack v. State, 381 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Collins v. State, 438 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Anderson v. State, 442 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Morris v. State, 395 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- In the Interest of R. W. G. v. State, 395 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Sullivan v. Division OF Elections, 413 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Rich v. State, 413 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)