ROBERT W. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Smith appeals the denial of his petition for credit for time served while on probation with special conditions including daily drug testing, treatment programs, and sex offender programming. The court affirmed the denial, holding that probation with special conditions does not constitute the type of coercive deprivation of liberty necessary for jail-time credit under Florida law.
The court held that Smith is not entitled to credit for time served on probation. While defendants receive credit for time in county jail before sentencing, they receive no credit for time in drug rehabilitation centers, halfway houses, probation centers, or restitution centers. Credit is only available for time in institutions serving as the functional equivalent of jail involving coercive deprivation of liberty and implicating significant constitutional rights. Smith's probation, which allowed him to be employed and come and go except for special conditions, did not meet this standard.
[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in county jail before sentencing.
[2] Time served in drug rehabilitation centers, halfway houses, and probation and restitution centers generally does not qualify for credit toward a sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“he will get no credit for time served in drug rehabilitation centers, halfway houses, and probation and restitution centers”
Establishes the general rule that probation time does not qualify for sentence credit
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was placed on probation with special conditions requiring him to deliver daily urine samples to a toxicology program at Jackson Memorial Hospita…
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PER CURIAM.
Robert Smith appeals the order denying his petition to recalculate credit for time served while on probation, during which time he was required to deliver daily urine samples to a toxicology program at Jackson Memorial Hospital, attend structured treatment programs and alcoholics anonymous meetings, and enter and complete a Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program.
While a defendant is entitled to “credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence,” § 921.161(1), Fla.Stat. (1991), he will get no credit for time served in drug rehabilitation centers, halfway houses, and probation and restitution centers. Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla.2d DCA 1987) (and cases cited therein). A defendant will, however, be given credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a jail, where the detention “constitute[s] a coercive deprivation of liberty and implicate^] significant constitutional rights.” Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla.1987).
Here, Smith was placed on probation with special conditions amounting to nothing more than attending behavior modification classes and refraining from alcohol use. He was employed, and certainly not constrained in any manner amounting to a coercive deprivation of liberty. As he was free to eome and go as he pleased except for the special conditions of his probation, we affirm the order denying his petition to recalculate credit for time served.1
. We note that various Florida courts have held that a defendant should receive credit for time spent while receiving treatment in the mentally disordered sex offender program run by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). See, e.g., Fogelman v. State, 410 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); White v. State, 408 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Abraham v. State, 382 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). However, this credit was pursuant to chapter 917, Florida Statutes, which was repealed by Laws 1985, chapter 85-62, § 71, effective July 30, 1985. See, e.g„ § 917.014, Fla.Stat. (1985) ("[t]ime spent in the treatment programs of [HRS] shall be considered time served on the sentence imposed upon the offender by the court”). Since chapter 917 was no longer in effect on the date of Smith’s sentencing, it is inapplicable.
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Whitehead v. State, 677 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…or time served as a condition of probation in a- live-in drug [*41] rehabilitation program, recognizing that probationary conditions of this nature generally do not constitute a coercive deprivation of liberty. 515 So. 2d at 739. See Smith v. State, 619 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (no credit for drug program which did not amount to coercive deprivation of liberty). But see Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (drug farm program treated as term of imprisonment for purpose of determining legali…
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Straughan v. State, 636 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…view requires a sentencing court to “credit” a defendant for time served on probation prior to revocation. That is not required nor permitted. § 921.161, Fla.Stat. (1991); Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla.1981); Holmes; Smith v. State, 619 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Further, such a view deprives the trial court of discretion to refashion a sentence short of straight prison time for a defendant who has violated his probation. That appears contrary to section 948.06(1) quoted above, and to Po…
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Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ingly, we reverse and remand for the court to award credit for such time accordingly. As to the appellant’s request for credit for time spent at the drug treatment center, however, we conclude he has no entitlement to the same. See Smith v. State, 619 So. 2d 994, 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (‘While a [*349] defendant is entitled to ‘credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence,’ Sec. 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (1991), he will get no credit for time served in drug rehabilitation centers, hal…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1987)
- Abraham v. State, 382 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Fogelman v. State, 410 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- White v. State, 408 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)