LUCIA CATALINA VAZQUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
GUSTAVO ARMANDO VAZQUEZ AND MARKS, ARONOVITZ & LEINOFF, APPELLEES
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Florida appellate court reversed a charging lien against a former wife because the motion seeking the lien used ambiguous language that failed to provide adequate notice of the specific amount and terms required by law.
A charging lien motion must provide clear and specific notice of the amount and terms sought; ambiguous and overly broad language is insufficient as a matter of law.
[1] A charging lien motion must provide clear and specific notice of the amount and terms sought; patently ambiguous and overly broad language fails to satisfy the notice req…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.”
Court's definition of charging lien, citing Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom
In a dissolution of marriage case, the final judgment awarded attorney's fees to the former wife. The former wife's attorneys moved for a charging lie…
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PER CURIAM.
The order appealed granted, inter alia, the former wife’s attorneys’ motion for a charging lien against the former wife in the amount of $7,837.50. We reverse that portion of the order upon the following brief analysis. A charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla.1983). Attorneys wishing to impose such a lien must show: (1) an express or implied contract between attorney and client; (2) an express or implied understanding for payment of attorney’s fees, either dependent upon or out of the recovery; (3) either an avoidance of payment or a dispute as to the amount of fees; and (4) timely notice. See Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla.1986) (citing Sinclair, Louis, 428 So. 2d at 1385). The final judgment of dissolution of marriage in the instant case included an award of attorney’s fees in favor of the former wife. The motion upon which the order appealed was granted sought “a charging lien and/or ... attorney’s fees to be paid ... either by Petitioner [former wife] or Respondent [former husband].” We have carefully considered the record, briefs, and arguments of counsel and conclude that the patently ambiguous and overly broad language of that motion renders it insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute adequate notice.
Reversed.
BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ., concur.
NESBITT, Judge
(specially concurring):
While I agree with the majority that the court’s order must be reversed, I prefer to base my concurrence on different reasoning. In my opinion, the case must be reversed because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief it granted. Once a trial court enters a final judgment and the time for filing post-trial motions has expired, the trial court may not, absent factors not present here, see e.g., Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.540, entertain any further motions in the case unless it specifically retained jurisdiction to do so in its final judgment. Keister v. Polen, 471 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); see Patin v. Popino, 459 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
The trial court retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to which Mrs. Vazquez was entitled but never retained jurisdiction to grant a charging lien to her attorneys.
Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant Mrs. Vazquez’s attorneys a charging lien against her recovery eleven months after the court had entered final judgment. See Keister, 471 So. 2d at 656. Of course her attorneys are free to continue to pursue their contractual remedies against Mrs. Vazquez. See Patin, 459 So. 2d at 436; Barranco, Darlson, Daniel & Bluestein, P.A. v. Winner, 386 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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Brown v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 614 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…on the terms and circumstances of its settlements with Brown and City Federal. Evans is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any disputed material facts relevant to these issues. We reject Vermont Mutual’s contention, based on Vasquez v. Vasquez, 512 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), that the notice of charging lien given by Evans was insufficient as a matter of law because his motion to withdraw alleged in the alternative that the court declare he “has a lien against any recovery made by [Brown] for [Vermont…
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Milio v. Leinoff & Silvers, P.A., 668 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…n, but one appeared in the final judgment signed by the court. Since Mr. Leinoff was taking a position adverse to that of his client when requesting the charging lien, Mr. Milio should have been provided with adequate notice. See Vazquez v. Vazquez, 512 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), citing Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A, v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.1983). The inclusion of the reservation of jurisdiction was improper. The charging lien retention in the final judgment was outside…
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Baker & Hostetler, LLP v. Swearingen, 998 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…t or is dismissed). A number of cases have addressed the issue of jurisdiction to consider a charging lien filed after the entry of a final judgment, but all of them appear to be distinguishable from the current case. The first, Vazquez v. Vazquez, 512 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), involves an effort to enforce a charging lien that was filed after the entry of the final judgment of dissolution. The tidal court granted the motion for a charging lien, and the wife appealed. The Third District Court reve…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sinclair v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983)
- Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1986)
- Melvyn B. Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Patin v. Popino, 459 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Barranco, Darlson, Daniel & Bluestein, P.A. v. Winner, 386 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Keister v. Honorable Mark E. Polen, 471 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)