BRITISH ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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British Robinson, a juvenile at the time of his offense, was sentenced as an adult for grand theft without the trial court considering all six statutory criteria required by Florida law. The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding that the grand theft was not a 'subsequent violation' under the applicable statute because it occurred before Robinson's prior adult conviction.
The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the grand theft was not a 'subsequent violation' under section 39.02(5)(d) because it occurred prior to both the filing of the petit theft information and the adjudication of guilt for petit theft. The trial court erred by failing to consider all six statutory criteria in determining whether adult sanctions were appropriate.
[1] A court errs by failing to consider all statutory criteria when imposing adult sanctions for a juvenile offense.
[2] A subsequent violation, for purposes of treating a juvenile as an adult, must occur after the child has been transferred for criminal prosecution and found to have commit…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to a waiver hearing or information and has been found to have committed the offense for which he is transferred or a lesser included offense, the child shall thereafter be handled in every respect as if he were an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law.”
This quote of the statutory language is central to the court's interpretation that 'subsequent violation' requires both a prior transfer and adjudication of guilt.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobinson was 16 years old when he committed grand theft on July 27, 1985. He was charged by information on February 10, 1986, entered a plea of nolo c…
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[original opinion at 12 F.L.W. 1962]
SHIVERS, Judge.
The appellant has called to our attention several factual errors regarding the dates of the two offenses involved in this appeal, occurring in the briefs as well as in our opinion. Appellant has supplemented the record on rehearing to reflect the correct dates surrounding both offenses. We with draw our opinion and substitute the following.
British Robinson appeals the trial court’s order imposing adult sanctions for an offense which took place when he was a juvenile, arguing that the court failed to consider each of the six statutory criteria in section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Robinson was charged by an information filed February 10,1986, with grand theft of more than $100 currency. The offense was alleged to have occurred on July 27, 1985, at which time Robinson was 16 years of age. A plea of nolo contendere was entered on August 19, 1986, and a sentencing hearing was held on October 27, 1986. After an adjudication of guilt, the court determined that adult sanctions were appropriate and entered a written order to that effect, utilizing only two of the six criteria in section 39.111(6)(c).
In response to the appeal, the State argued that Robinson’s prior adult conviction for petit theft rendered any judicial consideration of juvenile sentencing for the grand theft completely inappropriate under section 39.02(5)(d), Florida Statutes. Section 39.02(5)(d) provides as follows:
Once a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to a waiver hearing or information and has been found to have committed the offense for which he is transferred or a lesser included offense, the child shall thereafter be handled in every respect as if he were an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law.
Under the clear language of the statute, it appears that a “subsequent violation” is one which occurs only after: (1) a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution and (2) has been found to have committed the offense.
An information was filed against Robinson on September 10, 1985, charging him as an adult for a petit theft alleged to have occurred on July 27, 1985 — the same date as the grand theft. Robinson was adjudicated guilty of the petit theft on March 26, 1986, and was sentenced as an adult.1 Since the grand theft in the instant case occurred prior to both the date the petit theft information was filed and the date of the petit theft adjudication, the grand theft is not, under the plain language of the statute, a “subsequent violation.”
We therefore find that the trial court erred in failing to consider all six of the statutory criteria in section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes. West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Christy v. State, 489 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
Accordingly, the matter is reversed and remanded for resentencing.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
BARFIELD, J., concurs with written opinion.
. An appeal of this disposition is currently pending in the Second Judicial Circuit Court.
BARFIELD, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in result only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Kazakoff v. State, 642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…been found to have committed the offense for which he is transferred or a lesser included offense, the child shall thereafter be handled in every respect as if he were an adult for any subsequent violation of Florida law,.... In Robinson v. State, 514 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the court construed the identical language of this statute’s predecessor, section 39.02(5)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), in determining what constitutes a “subsequent violation of Florida law.” It observed that “[ujnder the clear…
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T.L.P. v. State, 657 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…urt, pursuant to this paragraph, imposes juvenile sanctions under s. 39.059(6). A subsequent violation occurs only after the juvenile has been transferred for criminal prosecution and has been found to have committed the offense. Robinson v. State, 514 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In this case, the acts upon which the juvenile charges were based were committed before T.L.P. was found to have committed the unrelated offense for which she was tried as an adult. Thus, the juvenile offenses were not subsequen…
Authorities Cited
- Posey v. State, 501 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Christy v. State, 489 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Akrivos v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Grady Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)