WILLIE F. LEONARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Willie Leonard appeals a juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction and a subsequent adult sentencing order. The court affirmed the waiver but reversed and remanded the sentencing because the trial judge failed to address all six statutory criteria required for imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile offender.
The court affirmed the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, finding the trial court adequately addressed the statutory criteria for transfer. However, the court reversed the sentencing order because the trial judge's determination of suitability for adult sanctions referenced only three of the six required statutory criteria, constituting reversible error requiring remand for resentencing.
[1] A trial court adequately addresses statutory criteria for waiving juvenile jurisdiction when it makes written findings considering each required factor.
[2] A trial court's determination of a child's sophistication and maturity for waiver purposes is satisfied when the court considers the child's emotional attitude and patter…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the failure to make findings as to each of the six criteria set forth in section 39.111(6)(c), (now 39.111(7)(c)), constitutes reversible error”
Establishes the legal standard that all six statutory factors must be addressed when determining suitability for adult sanctions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeonard was charged with third-degree murder in juvenile court. The state moved to waive juvenile jurisdiction, and the trial court granted the motion…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Juvenile Jurisdiction cases and more on FLexlaw
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal of a trial judge’s order, waiving juvenile jurisdiction, and another trial judge’s order, determining that adult sanctions are appropriate. We affirm the former, reverse the latter and remand with direction to proceed in accordance herewith.
Appellant was charged in juvenile court with third degree murder. The state sought to have appellant transferred for criminal prosecution as an adult. On the state's motion, the trial court entered a written order waiving juvenile jurisdiction over appellant, certifying him for trial as an adult, setting bond and ordering appellant to stay away from the victim’s family and from school. A review of the order entered in the instant case reveals that the trial court adequately addressed each of the criteria set forth in section 39.09(2)(c), Florida Statutes, (1985) in determining whether appellant should be transferred.
Given the court’s direct mention of its consideration of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services’ Waiver Hearing Report, it appears to us that the intention of section 39.09(2)(c)(6), Florida Statutes, (1985) i.e., that the child’s emotional attitude and pattern of living be considered in a determination of the child’s sophistication and maturity, was satisfied.
After the trial court granted the state’s motion to transfer appellant for criminal prosecution, appellant was charged by information with third degree murder. He entered a plea of no contest to the offense charged. In sentencing appellant, the trial court determined that he should be treated as an adult and sentenced him to a term of six years in the Department of Corrections as a youthful offender. Appellant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him in that the Order Determining to Impose Adult Sanctions made reference to only three of the six criteria set forth in section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986). That statutory section provides:
(c) Suitability or nonsuitability for adult sanctions shall be determined by the court before any other determination of disposition. The suitability determination shall be made by reference to the following criteria:
1. The seriousness of the offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires adult disposition.
2. Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner. 3. Whether the offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.
5. The record and previous history of the child, including: a. Previous contacts with the department, the Department of Corrections, other law enforcement agencies, and courts,
b. Prior periods of probation or community control,
c. Prior adjudications that the child committed a violation of law, and
d. Prior commitments to institutions.
6. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child if he is assigned to juvenile services and facilities.
A review of the order entered herein reveals that the trial court referred only to statutory subsections 2, 3 and 6. This court has held that the failure to make findings as to each of the six criteria set forth in section 39.111(6)(c), (now 39.-111(7)(c)), constitutes reversible error. West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Thus, the appellant’s sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
HERSEY, C.J., and LETTS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kazakoff v. State, 642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…2d 515, 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). We also conclude that the order, [*599] when read in its entirety, reflects the trial court properly considered and evaluated all of the other criteria. See W.B. v. State, 313 So. 2d 711 (Fla.1975); Leonard v. State, 522 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). . We do likewise with regard to Rice v. State, 311 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), which was the [*600] underpinning for the holding in G.D.W. 395 So. 2d at 639 n. 3. We leave undisturbed, however, that aspect of Rice that holds…
-
In the Interest of D.W., 616 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)….J.B. v. State, 394 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), approv’d, 408 So. 2d 1048 (Fla.1982). Neither is involved here. The issue presented in the instant case is one for consideration in the event of adjudication and sentencing. See Leonard v. State, 522 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Townsend v. State, 398 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and LETTS and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.…
-
Gooden v. State, 536 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1987). Particularly, the court failed to treat item # 4 of said statute. The case law is clear that, in sentencing a juvenile as an adult, the court must treat all of the statutory criteria. Leonard v. State, 522 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to consider, in writing, all…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Akrivos v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Grady Upshaw v. State, 464 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)