STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STEVEN J. RASKIEWICZ, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appealed a sentence imposed below the sentencing guidelines range for a probation violation. The court reversed, holding that the trial court provided no valid basis for departing downward from the recommended guideline range.
The court held that the trial court's three stated reasons for mitigation—physical impairment, defendant's age, and absence of new criminal violations—were all legally insufficient to justify departure from the guideline recommendation, and therefore reversed and directed imposition of a sentence within the recommended range.
[1] A physical impairment is an insufficient basis for granting a lesser sentence when the record does not demonstrate it presents a significant impediment to gainful, lawful…
[2] An offender's youthfulness alone will not support mitigation of a guideline sentence unless additional factors, such as lack of ordinary intelligence or marked emotional…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court gave three reasons for mitigating the recommended sentence, none of which are valid”
Establishes the appellate court's conclusion that all of the trial court's stated reasons for departure lack legal merit
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1984, Raskiewicz pled guilty to burglary, grand theft, and arson and was placed on probation. He violated probation by failing to report to his pro…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Violation Of Probation cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from a sentence which was less than that recommended under the sentencing guidelines. We agree that no basis existed for departing from the guideline recommendation and reverse.
In 1984 appellee Steven Raskiewicz pled guilty to burglary, grand theft, and arson, and was placed on probation. Within a few months an affidavit of violation was filed alleging that Raskiewicz had failed to report to his probation officer as directed. At some point after a warrant had issued Raskiewicz did contact the probation officer, but when apprised of the warrant Raskiewicz absconded to California. He remained there for four years until his arrest on the outstanding warrant.
Raskiewicz admitted the violation and was sentenced August 3,1988. The recommended sentence fell within the five year range, with the court having the option of enhancing the sentence one cell due to the violation of probation. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(14); 3.988(i). Instead the court restored Raskiewicz to probation, adding the special condition that he serve 364 days in jail.
The court gave three reasons for mitigating the recommended sentence, none of which are valid:
(1) Physical impairment. At sentencing Raskiewicz asserted that he was “legally blind,” thus unable to obtain employment, and as a result had spent most of his time in California on welfare. These facts are not unlike those in State v. Thomas, 516 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), where in the court stated that being blind in one eye was an insufficient basis for granting a lesser sentence. While Raskiewicz’s infirmity was not disputed, the record in the present case dispels any suggestion that it presented a significant impediment to his ability to maintain gainful, lawful employment. Raskiewicz admitted, in response to questioning from the court, that he had held jobs when residing in Florida, and the court expressed her opinion that Raskiew-icz had “used” the impairment. This being the case, Raskiewicz’s impaired vision was irrelevant to the appropriateness of the guideline recommendation.
(2) Defendant’s age. At the time he appeared before the court to answer for his violation of probation Raskiewicz was 23 years old. An offender’s youthfulness alone will not support mitigation of a guideline sentence unless additional factors, such as lack of ordinary intelligence or marked emotional immaturity, also are present. State v. Riley, 530 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Nothing in the record before us indicates that Raskiew-icz’s unremarkable age affected his ability to conform to the requirements of the law.
(3) “No [new] violation of law. ” The trial court appears to have attached significance to the fact Raskiewicz committed no additional crimes after he was placed on probation. Absence of criminal activity is an invalid reason for a sentence departure. State v. Green, 511 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The guideline scoresheet takes into consideration any such misconduct or lack thereof. Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296 (Fla.1987).
We reverse the trial court’s order restoring Raskiewicz to probation with special conditions and direct the imposition of a sentence within the recommended guideline range. Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla.1987).
CAMPBELL, C.J., and DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Geoghagan, 27 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…ate v. Stephenson, 973 So. 2d 1259, 1264-1265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding trial court’s finding that the defendant “kept his nose clean” for 14 months since his release from prison was an invalid reason for departure). See also State v. Raskiewicz, 541 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (finding fact that the defendant had committed no additional crimes since being placed on probation was an invalid reason for departure because it was taken into account by the sentencing guidelines). Seventh, the trial court fou…
-
Kazakoff v. State, 642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…on will be the conservation of judicial resources. Under the current state of the law, an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring a child for adult prosecution “is not a final order and not an appeal-able nonfinal order.” A.F. v. State, 541 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (emphasis in original). Further, “[a]ny error committed by the trial court may be raised only on appeal from the final judgment and sentence.” Id,.; In the Interest of D.W., 616 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Thus, given an appel…
Authorities Cited
- Shull v. Dugger, 515 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1987)
- Sanders v. State, 510 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. Thomas, 516 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- State v. Kilby Holton, 530 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- State v. Riley, 530 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Ernsberger v. State, 511 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- State v. Green, 511 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)