WILLIAM MARKHAM, AS BROWARD COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER, JOSEPH ROSENHAGEN, AS BROWARD COUNTY REVENUE COLLECTOR AND RANDY MILLER, AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, PETITIONERS,
v.
HONORABLE HARRY G. HINCKLEY, JR., CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, AND JOHN L.A. BOND, RESPONDENTS
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The court granted a writ of prohibition preventing a trial court from exercising jurisdiction over a taxpayer's challenge to a property tax assessment where the taxpayer failed to timely pay the required good faith tax deposit. The decision reaffirms that the jurisdictional requirements of Florida's tax assessment statute must be strictly enforced, regardless of equitable considerations.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by allowing the action to proceed. The jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 are mandatory and must be strictly enforced; a court loses jurisdiction when a taxpayer fails to pay good faith taxes before they become delinquent, and late payment cannot restore jurisdiction regardless of equitable considerations.
[1] A court shall lose jurisdiction of a tax assessment contest case when the taxpayer fails to pay taxes admitted in good faith to be owing before they become delinquent.
[2] Failure to make a timely good faith tax deposit is a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal of a tax assessment contest action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By then the action was legally dead for lack of jurisdiction; the late tender could not breathe life back into the action, even were we to construe the statute so as to permit tender of payment, and refusal of tender, to be the equivalent of actual payment for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss.”
Establishes that late payment of taxes cannot cure jurisdictional defects in tax assessment contest actions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn L.A. Bond filed an action to contest a 1986 property tax assessment pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes. Bond failed to make timely pay…
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DELL, Judge.
Petitioners seek a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County from the exercise of jurisdiction in an action filed by John L.A. Bond v. William Markham, Broward County Property Appraiser, et al., Case No. 86-32883. Petitioners claim the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss respondent Bond’s suit which was brought pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1985), to contest a 1986 assessment on his property. Respondent Bond concedes that he did not make timely payment of his good faith tax deposit for the calendar year 1987. However, he claims that based on his equitable defenses the trial court correctly denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
In Clark v. Cook, 481 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), the taxpayer timely filed an action to contest a tax assessment. However, the taxpayer did not make his good faith tender of the taxes due until more than sixty days had expired after certification of the tax roll. This court granted a writ of prohibition and held:
Finally, we know that the property owner did not tender to the tax collector what it admitted in good faith to be owing until January 30, 1985. By then the action was legally dead for lack of jurisdiction; the late tender could not breathe life back into the action, even were we to construe the statute so as to permit tender of payment, and refusal of tender, to be the equivalent of actual payment for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss. Id. at 931.
The Florida Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Bystrom v. Diaz, 514 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.1987), that the jurisdictional requirements of section 194.171 must be strictly enforced:
Although subsections 194.171(5) and (6) appear to be somewhat harsh, their meaning is clear. Subsection 194.171(5) plainly states that a taxpayer may not maintain a suit contesting a tax assessment, and that such an action “shall be dismissed, unless all taxes on the property assessed in years after the action is brought, which the taxpayer in good faith admits to be owing, are paid before they become delinquent.” Subsection (6) expressly declares that these requirements are jurisdictional and that “[a] court shall lose jurisdiction of a case when the taxpayer has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (5).” The statute does not allow a court to retain jurisdiction once taxes become delinquent. Id. at 1074-75.
Accordingly, we grant petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition and direct the trial court to enter an order of dismissal with prejudice of the action filed by the respondent, John L.A. Bond, against petitioners.
PROHIBITION GRANTED.
LETTS and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Markham v. Moriarty, 575 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…wer without jurisdiction. Such a writ may issue where a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss a cause of action contesting a tax assessment where the jurisdiction requirements of section 194.171 are not met. Markham v. Hinckley, 544 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1989); Clark v. Cook, 481 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Section 194.171, Florida Statutes provides in part: (emphasis added) (2) No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 da…1 / 2
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State v. The Honorable Leonard L. Stafford, 646 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…e trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss a cause of action challenging a tax assessment because the sixty-day filing period for contesting a tax assessment of subsection 194.171(2) had not been met. See also Markham v. Hinckley, 544 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied sub nom. Bond v. Markham, 553 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1989); Clark v. Cook, 481 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The sixty-day requirement of subsection 194.171(2) has been strictly enforced as a jurisdictional statute of nonclai…
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Mirabal v. State, 553 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…jurisdiction.” We find no merit and affirm. Bystrom v. Diaz, 514 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.1987); North Port Bank v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 313 So. 2d 683 (Fla.1975); Department of Revenue v. Rudd, 545 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Markham v. Hinckley, 544 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Hirsch v. Crews, 494 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Clark v. Cook, 481 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Henry v. Lemac Builders, Inc., 245 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Miami Super Cold Co. v. Giffin Industries, Inc., 178 So. 2…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bystrom v. Diaz, 514 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1987)
- Clark v. Honorable Jack H. Cook, 481 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)