STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ELISHUA JOSHUA WRIGHT, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appeals the dismissal of three DUI charges involving property damage to separate vehicles. The court reverses, holding that a drunk driver who damages multiple vehicles can be prosecuted for separate counts of DUI with property damage under Florida Statute § 316.193(3)(c)1, as each count involves a different victim.
Multiple counts for DUI with property damage do not violate double jeopardy when different victims' property is involved. The legislature contemplated separate offenses for damage to different victims' property, and separate convictions are constitutional when different victims are harmed.
[1] Driving under the influence causing damage to the property of another constitutes a separate offense for each victim whose property is damaged.
[2] Multiple counts for driving under the influence causing damage to property are permissible even if the defendant's vehicle only directly collided with one vehicle, as lon…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“These counts do not merely charge the offense of DUI, but DUI with the additional element of causing damage to the property of another.”
Explains that the charges involve a distinct statutory offense under § 316.193(3)(c)1, not merely duplicative DUI counts
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and caused damage to four separate vehicles in a single incident. The defendant's vehicle col…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Separate Offenses cases and more on FLexlaw
NIMMONS, Judge.
The state appeals from an order dismissing three of the four counts charging the defendant with driving while under the influence of alcohol and causing damage to the property of another. We reverse.
According to the evidence presented to the trial court in connection with the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the defendant operated a motor vehicle while drunk and caused damage to four separate vehicles.1
In each of the subject counts, the defendant was charged under Section 316.-193(3)(c)l., Florida Statutes (1987). Section 316.193 provides, in pertinent part:
(1)A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2)if such person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired; or (b) The person has a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher. **
(3)Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection ax-
do) Who operates a vehicle; and (c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes:
1. Damage to the property or person of another is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. (emphasis added).
The defendant’s contention that the charging of multiple counts was a violation of double jeopardy principles is not well grounded. These counts do not merely charge the offense of DUI, but DUI with the additional element of causing damage to the property of another. The logical extension of the appellant’s argument would mean that a drunk driver who causes multiple deaths could be prosecuted for only one count of DUI manslaughter under Section 316.193(3)(c)3.2 Damage to the property of another by a drunk driver is proscribed (Section 316.193(3)(c)l.) by the legislature just as the injury or killing of another by a drunk driver is proscribed (Section 316.193(3)(c)l., 2. and 3.).
It is abundantly clear from Section 316.-193 that the legislature contemplated separate offenses where different victims are injured or killed, or where the driver causes damage to different victims’ property. Separate convictions for the subject four counts are not violative of the defendant’s double jeopardy rights since different vic tims are involved. See Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2nd DCA, 1989); Watford v. State, 525 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Douglas v. State, 349 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Accordingly, the order of dismissal is REVERSED.
THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Defendant’s car actually collided with only one car but caused a chain reaction in which a total of four vehicles were damaged. As long as the defendant caused the damage to the four vehicles, it makes no difference that the defendant's vehicle actually came into collision with only one.
. The prosecution of multiple counts for DUI manslaughter is apparently commonplace, and not open to serious question. E.g. State v. Naumowicz, 535 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2003)…aughter statute. See McHugh v. State, 160 Fla. 823, 36 So. 2d 786, 787 (1948) (stating that the great weight of authority supports the view that under the DUI manslaughter statute “[tjhere is an offense for each unlawful homicide”); State v. Wright, 546 So. 2d 798, 799 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (stating that the prosecution of multiple counts of DUI manslaughter arising from a single DUI incident is commonplace and not open to serious question); Pulaski v. State, 540 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (stating…
-
Wonderlick v. State, 651 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant’s convictions, and the lifetime revocation of his driver’s license. See Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1994); State v. Wright, 546 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). However, because the parties operated under a misapprehension of the law as to the revocation of appellant’s driver’s license, the affirmance is without prejudice to appellant…
-
Bautista v. State, 832 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…driver’s intoxication results in his or her inability to drive safely. The DUI driver may sustain multiple convictions because the violation causes injury to each victim. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 765 (Fla.1996). See also State v. Wright, 546 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(“It is abundantly clear from Section 316.193 that the legislature contemplated separate of [*125] fenses where different victims are injured or killed, or where the driver causes damage to different victims’ property.”). We…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Douglas v. State, 349 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Watford v. State, 525 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- State v. Jo-El Paul Naumowicz, 535 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)