WILLIAM ONESKY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Onesky challenges his convictions for DUI manslaughter, manslaughter by culpable negligence, and two counts of DUI with injury as violating double jeopardy protections. The court affirms, holding that separate convictions for distinct statutory offenses involving different victims do not violate double jeopardy.
Separate convictions for distinct statutory offenses involving different victims do not violate double jeopardy rights. The Florida legislature intended to provide separate offenses and penalties for each violation where different victims are involved, making multiple convictions appropriate.
[1] Separate convictions for offenses arising from the same incident are not violative of double jeopardy rights when different victims are involved.
[2] Legislative intent, as stated in statutes, is the primary consideration when reviewing a double jeopardy claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In reviewing a double jeopardy claim under the federal and state constitutions, we must first look to legislative intent as stated in the statutes.”
Establishes the court's analytical approach to double jeopardy claims
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOnesky drove under the influence and collided with another vehicle, killing one person and injuring two others. A jury convicted him of one count of D…
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
Defendant, William Onesky, contends that his convictions and sentences violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. We disagree.
While driving under the influence of intoxicants, Onesky collided with another vehicle. One person was killed and two others were injured. A jury found Onesky guilty of one count of DUI manslaughter and one count of manslaughter by culpable negligence with respect to the deceased victim, as well as two separate counts of bodily injury regarding the other victims. The trial judge merged the two manslaughter counts.
Accordingly, Onesky was convicted of one count of manslaughter by culpable negligence, one count of DUI involving serious bodily injuries to another, and one count of DUI involving damage or injury to another. The court imposed the minimum recommended guidelines sentence of seven years, followed by five years’ probation. In reviewing a double jeopardy claim under the federal and state constitutions, we must first look to legislative intent as stated in the statutes. Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1987).
The Florida legislature has proscribed “the killing of a human being by the ... culpable negligence of another” as a second-degree felony. § 782.07, Fla.Stat. (1987).
A person who commits the offense of DUI and causes “damage to the property or person of another” is guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor. § 316.193(3)(c)(l), Fla.Stat. (1987).
In contrast, one who inflicts “serious bodily injury to another” while committing the offense of DUI is guilty of a third-degree felony. § 316.193(3)(e)(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). From our examination of these statutes, we believe the legislature intended to provide separate offenses and penalties for the commission of each of these offenses where different victims are involved.
Therefore, separate convictions for these offenses are not violative of One-sky’s double jeopardy rights since different victims are involved. See Douglas v. State, 349 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Onesky contends that Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), is disposi-tive of this appeal.
We disagree. In Hoag, the Fifth District held that Hoag could only be convicted once for violating section 316.-027, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: “The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident.” Although Hoag’s accident caused four injuries and one death, there was only one “scene of the accident” and, accordingly, only one failure to stop.
Thus, Hoag is inapposite to the instant case because One-sky was convicted of violating criminal statutes which are specific in reference to “the killing of a human being,” injury to “property or person of another," and “serious bodily injury to another.” (Emphasis added).
In contrast to Hoag, we think that under these circumstances the legislature intended that each of the three legislative proscriptions form a separate basis for Onesky’s prosecution, conviction, and punishment.
Given our disposition of Onesky’s double jeopardy argument, it was proper for the trial judge to score each offense and resulting victim injury for sentencing purposes. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(7); Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Re Sentencing Guidelines (Rules 3.701 and 3.988), 509 So. 2d 1088 (Fla.1987).
Affirmed.
DANAHY and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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State v. Elishua Joshua Wright, 546 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…killed, or where the driver causes damage to different victims’ property. Separate convictions for the subject four counts are not violative of the defendant’s double jeopardy rights since different vic [*800] tims are involved. See Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2nd DCA, 1989); Watford v. State, 525 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Douglas v. State, 349 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Accordingly, the order of dismissal is REVERSED. THOMPSON and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Defendant’s car actually col…
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State v. Lamoureux, 660 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…including precedent from our own jurisdiction, which hold that multiple convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury are indeed permissible for injuries to more than one victim arising out of a single driving episode. See Pulaski; Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Wick v. State, 651 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA [*1065] 1995); Wright; Melbourne v. State, 655 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In fact, in Wick, the Third District followed its previous holding in Wright and distinguished Boutwell on…
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Wonderlick v. State, 651 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant’s convictions, and the lifetime revocation of his driver’s license. See Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1994); State v. Wright, 546 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). However, because the parties operated under a misapprehension of the law as to the revocation of appellant’s driver’s license, the affirmance is without prejudice to appellant’s filing a motion to withdraw his plea or a rule 3.85…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dion Michael Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987)
- FLA. RULES OF CRIM. PROCEDURE RE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (RULES 3.701 & 3.988), 509 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987)
- Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Douglas v. State, 349 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)