STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
PATRICK ALLEN YOUNG, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding whether a juvenile's aftercare status constitutes a legal restraint for sentencing guidelines purposes. The Court held that juvenile aftercare does constitute such a restraint, thereby allowing additional points to be assessed at sentencing.
Juvenile aftercare status does constitute a legal restraint for purposes of assessing points under the sentencing guidelines. The Court quashed the First District's decision in Young and approved the Second District's reasoning in Butler.
[1] Juvenile aftercare postcommitment programs constitute a legal restraint for assessing points under the sentencing guidelines.
[2] The intent of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission was for a person to be treated more harshly for committing a crime while still under penalty for a prior crime.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the applicable rule points shall be added whenever the defendant, at the time of the offense before the court for sentencing, was on community control. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(6). The rule does not distinguish between the adult sanction known as community control, as defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1987), and community control programs applicable to juveniles.”
Establishes that the sentencing rule applies equally to both adult and juvenile community control programs
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatrick Allen Young, age 16, was committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and placed in a restrictive program at the Arthur G…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Community Control cases and more on FLexlaw
McDonald, justice.
We review Young v. State, 549 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), to resolve conflict with Butler v. State, 543 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The issue is whether a person’s juvenile aftercare postcommitment program constitutes a legal restraint for assessing points under the sentencing guidelines. Young holds that it does not; Butler holds that it does. We quash Young and approve Butler. As penalty for having committed a felony, Young, aged sixteen years, was committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) and placed at the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys, a restrictive and punitive program. After ninety days, Young was released on aftercare, a postconviction program, and directed to report to HRS and fulfill additional sanctions, including counseling. Young reported once, but did not report again or go to counseling. Instead, he committed a new felony. He was charged and was to be tried as an adult when he pled guilty to the new offense.
The trial judge found it proper to include points allocated for a person under legal restraint to a juvenile on aftercare status following a juvenile commitment. The district court, relying on its decision in Ellison v. State, 547 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), quashed, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1990), disagreed. Ellison held including such points improper because the juvenile was on “furlough status” and because rule 3.701(d)(6), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not specifically include furlough status in those categories under which an offender must fall if points for legal status are to be addressed.
In Butler the second district resolved this issue by stating:
Under the applicable rule points shall be added whenever the defendant, at the time of the offense before the court for sentencing, was on community control. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(6). The rule does not distinguish between the adult sanction known as community control, as defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1987), and community control programs applicable to juveniles. See Espinosa v. State, 496 So. 2d 236, 237 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Testimony that a furlough is basically the same as community control is consistent with Rule 10H-1.003, Florida Administrative Code, which defines a furlough as “release of a child, pursuant to an executed conditional agreement, from a treatment program of the Department to supervision in the community.” See also, Rule 10H-9.003 F.A.C.
543 So. 2d at 433.
It was the intent of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission that a person be treated more harshly for committing a crime while still under penalty for a prior crime. The second district’s analysis accurately reflects this intent while the opinion under review does not. Hence, we quash Young and remand with instructions to reinstate the sentence imposed by the trial judge.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Ellison, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1990)…nterpreting Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(6) as excluding juvenile furlough status from legal constraint for the purpose of adding status points to the guidelines scoresheet. We agree. This Court addressed this issue in State v. Young, 561 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1990), holding that juvenile furlough constitutes legal constraint for the purpose of guidelines sentencing. [*577] We agree with the district court’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that Ellison acted out of “ill-will, hatred,…
-
Brown v. State, 569 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1990)…that the violation of specific conditions for release on bail, such as in Brown’s case, is the equivalent of legal constraint and should be scored as such on the guidelines scoresheet. This is consistent with our recent decisions in State v. Young, 561 So. 2d 583 (Fla.1990) (juvenile aftercare considered as legal constraint), and State v. Ellison, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1990) (juvenile furlough considered as legal constraint). When a person’s status is scored as legal constraint, it cannot be used as the basis…1 / 2
-
Carmine Annunziata v. State, 697 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…owers v. State, 586 So. 2d 1058 (Fla.1991); Williams v. State, 680 So. 2d 532, 533-34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The change in the rule appears to have been intended to restore one of the rule’s purposes identified by the supreme court in State v. Young, 561 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 1990) — to treat a person more harshly than otherwise for committing a crime while under penalty for a prior crime. This can be seen by examining the recent history of this area. Prior to 1994, offenders with a “legal status” included tho…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ellison, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1990)
- Ellison v. State, 547 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Butler v. State, 543 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Yarberry v. State, 496 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Espinosa v. State, 496 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Young v. State, 549 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)