ROBERTO ESPINOSA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Espinosa was convicted of aggravated battery after being indicted for first-degree murder. The appellate court found that a jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on causation, but deemed the error harmless because the verdict showed the jury did not find Espinosa responsible for causing death. The court vacated the sentencing for upward departure from guidelines and remanded for resentencing.
The instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on causation in violation of due process; however, the error was harmless because the verdict reflected the jury did not hold the defendant responsible for causing death. The upward departure from sentencing guidelines was improper because the reasons given were unjustified under prevailing law.
[1] An instruction that impermissibly shifts the burden of proof as to causation from the prosecution to the defendant violates due process.
[2] An erroneous jury instruction that shifts the burden of proof on a vital element of a crime is harmless when the jury's verdict reflects that the defendant was not found…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is no doubt that this charge impermissibly shifts the burden of proof as to a vital element of a homicide charge, causation, from the prosecution and thus constitutes a violation of due process.”
Establishes the instructional error violated due process by shifting burden on causation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEspinosa was indicted for first-degree murder but found guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated battery. The trial judge gave a jury instruction st…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Espinosa was indicted for first-degree murder and found guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated battery. The only appellate point he raises concerning the conviction claims error in the following instruction, given over objection:
It is the general law of this State that when the prosecution has produced evidence of the connection between the act complained of and the death, it is the duty of the defendant to come forward with evidence to show that death resulted from some other cause.
There is no doubt that this charge imper-missibly shifts the burden of proof as to a vital element of a homicide charge, causation, from the prosecution and thus constitutes a violation of due process. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2459, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 51 (1979); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318, 319, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1973, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 360 (1985). Because, however, the verdict reflects that the jury did not hold the defendant responsible for causing the victim’s death, it is apparent that the charge in question had no effect on the result and was therefore entirely harmless. Hearn v. James, 677 F. 2d 841 (11th Cir.1982) (instruction which erroneously shifted burden of proof as to intent required for murder charge harmless when defendant convicted of manslaughter which requires no intent); Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413 (1900) (error as to instruction on murder harmless when jury convicted defendant of manslaughter); Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287 (1903) (error as to instruction on first-degree murder harmless when defendant convicted of third-degree murder); Day v. State, 54 Fla. 25, 44 So. 715 (1907) (error as to instruction on first-degree murder harmless when defendant convicted of second-degree murder); § 59.041, Fla.Stat. (1985); § 924.33, Fla.Stat. (1985).
Turning to Espinosa’s challenge to his sentence, we find that the trial judge departed upward from the guidelines for reasons which are each unjustified under the prevailing law. Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308 (1986); Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla.1985); Echevarria v. State, 492 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Smith v. State, 482 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Accordingly, the sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for resentencing within the guidelines as properly computed.1
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
. In this regard, the parties agree that points may be scored in the "legal constraint” category because the defendant was on juvenile community control at the time of the incident.
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State v. Young, 561 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1990)…l. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(6). The rule does not distinguish between the adult sanction known as community control, as defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1987), and community control programs applicable to juveniles. See Espinosa v. State, 496 So. 2d 236, 237 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Testimony that a furlough [*584] is basically the same as community control is consistent with Rule 10H-1.003, Florida Administrative Code, which defines a furlough as “release of a child, pursuant to an executed condit…
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Rigoberto Garcia v. State, 535 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ty taken was worth $51). See also Lewis v. State, 419 So. 2d 337 (Fla.1982) (failure to instruct jury of minimum and maximum penalties for primary offense charged was harmless where jury convicted only on lesser-included offense); Espinosa v. State, 496 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (error in instruction on burden of proving causation of death was harmless where jury convicted only on aggravated assault charge and therefore did not hold the defendant responsible for causing victim’s death). See generally 11 C…
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Butler v. State, 543 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…l. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(6). The rule does not distinguish between the adult sanction known as community control, as defined in section 948.001, Florida Statutes (1987), and community control programs applicable to juveniles. See Espinosa v. State, 496 So. 2d 236, 237 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Testimony that a furlough is basically the same as community control is consistent with Rule 10H-1.003, Florida Administrative Code, which defines a furlough as “release of a child, pursuant to an executed conditional a…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1979)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1985)
- Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1985)
- Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1986)
- Mathis v. State, 45 Fla. 46 (Fla. 1903)
- Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528 (Fla. 1900)
- Nivaldo Echevarria v. State, 492 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Hearn v. Elton Floyd James, 677 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1982)
- Smith v. State, 482 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Day v. State, 54 Fla. 25 (Fla. 1907)