REGINA WESLEY HILL, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE RICHARD Y. FEDER, RESPONDENT

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-07-31
No. 90-966
Before NESBITT, BASKIN and GODERICH, JJ.
564 So. 2d 609 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 15 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal granted a writ of prohibition disqualifying a trial judge who denied a motion for disqualification. The judge's attempt to refute allegations of partiality by characterizing them as 'totally false' created an adversarial atmosphere and established grounds for disqualification under Florida law.


Holding

A trial judge's attempt to refute charges of partiality by characterizing allegations as 'totally false' establishes grounds for disqualification. A writ of prohibition is both an appropriate and necessary remedy once a basis for disqualification has been established.


Headnotes

[1] A judge's attempt to refute allegations of partiality in a motion for disqualification establishes grounds for disqualification.

[2] A judge reviewing a motion for disqualification should limit their determination to legal sufficiency and avoid creating an adversarial atmosphere with the litigant.

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Key Quotes

“Our disqualification rule, which limits the trial judge to a bare determination of legal sufficiency, was expressly designed to prevent what occurred in this case— the creation of 'an intolerable adversary atmosphere' between the trial judge and the litigant.”

Establishes the fundamental purpose of disqualification rules—judges should not engage in adversarial interactions with litigants when reviewing disqualification motions

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Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner Hill filed a motion for disqualification against trial judge Feder, asserting several reasons why she would not receive fair treatment. The…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner requests a writ of prohibition disqualifying the trial judge. Petitioner asserts several reasons for her belief that she will not receive fair treatment from respondent. She presented those reasons to the trial judge in a motion for disqualification. In an order denying the motion for disqualification, the trial judge stated:

Without reaching the truth of the allegations (which must be presumed true, thought [sic] in fact totally false), the Court is faced with “subjective fears” based on certain “happenings” (comments of ex-husband, actions of counsel, etc.). These fears which are based on interpretations of the tone of the Court’s pronouncement or those conclusions based on what “seemed” [to] fall into the “frivolous allegations” of Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986).

The trial judge’s comments that the allegations are “in fact, totally false” place him in the same adversarial position the court condemned in Management Corp. of America, Inc. v. Grossman, 396 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see also MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.1990); Gieseke v. Moriarty, 471 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). In Management Corp., the appellate court held that by attempting to refute charges of partiality, the judge establishes grounds for disqualification. In Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1978), the court stated:

Our disqualification rule, which limits the trial judge to a bare determination of legal sufficiency, was expressly designed to prevent what occurred in this case— the creation of ‘an intolerable adversary atmosphere’ between the trial judge and the litigant. See Department of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla.1975) (On Reconsideration). .

Once a basis for disqualification has been established, prohibition is both an appropriate and necessary remedy. Brown v. Rowe, 96 Fla. 289, 118 So. 9 (1928).

Bundy, 366 So. 2d at 442. Judges should not try to defend honor or reputation when reviewing motions for disqualification. We therefore grant the petition for writ of prohibition; we assume it will not be necessary to issue the writ.

Remanded for further proceedings.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Shumpert v. State, 703 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …366 So. 2d at 442 (citation omitted). The most flagrant violation of this rule occurs when the trial court unequivocally states that the allegations in the affidavit are untrue. See Frost v. Ward, 622 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Hill v. Feder, 564 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Trial courts which conduct hearings, receive affidavits from third parties, or engage in argument with the filing attorney to determine the factual correctness of allegations in support of disqualification invite successful prohi…
  • Valltos v. State, 707 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …quiry and on that basis alone establish grounds for disqualification. See Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.1978). See also Frost v. Ward, 622 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Townsend v. State, 564 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Hill v. Feder, 564 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Clark Auto Leasing and Rentals, Inc. v. Lupo, 547 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). This principle applies with equal force to a response filed in a prohibition proceeding in the appellate court by the trial judge whose partiality…
  • Stewart v. Judge E. Vernon Douglas, 597 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …udge Douglas’s order to be in error. We find, however, that in the written comment quoted above, the trial judge improperly passed on the truth of the facts alleged. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.432(d); Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1978); Hill v. Feder, 564 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Accordingly, he must be disqualified from further presiding in the forfeiture action and therefore the petition for writ of prohibition is GRANTED. JOANOS, C.J., and MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.…

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