MARCUS ROLAND MAYE
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The appellant argued his life sentence as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) was unconstitutional because a judge, not a jury, determined the facts supporting the PRR designation.
No, a life sentence as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) is not unconstitutional under these circumstances. The factual determinations required for PRR designation, such as the release date and the nature of the qualifying offense, are ministerial and do not require jury findings.
[1] Factual determinations regarding a defendant's release date from prison or jail and the nature of a qualifying offense for Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentencing are…
[2] Proof of a defendant's release date, which subjects them to a sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, is not required to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonabl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reject this argument because the date a defendant was released from prison or jail and the nature of the qualifying offense are ministerial in nature and thus do not require jury findings.”
This quote explains the court's primary reasoning for rejecting the appellant's argument.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarcus Roland Maye appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He contended that his life sentence as a Prison Releasee Reoffend…
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WOZNIAK, J.
Marcus Roland Maye appeals the trial court's denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.1 Maye argues, as he did in the trial court proceeding, that his life sentence as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (“PRR”) is unconstitutional because the factual determinations required to support that
PRR designation were made by the judge, not the jury. See § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (2022) (defining PRR to mean a defendant who commits a qualifying offense within three years of release from prison or jail). We reject this argument because the date a defendant was released from prison or jail and the nature of the qualifying offense are ministerial in nature and thus do not require jury findings. See Robinson v. State, 793 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2001) ("[P]roof to the jury of a defendant's release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the [PRR] Act is not required."). We agree with the reasoning set forth in the following three cases: Robinson v. State, 337 So. 3d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ("[B]ecause a defendant's date of release from a prior prison sentence is directly derivative of a prior conviction, it need not be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a defendant to be subject to a PRR sentence." (citing Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014))); Simmons v. State, 332 So. 3d 1129, 1131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (concluding that "establishing the date of release from prison is simply a ministerial act" that does not require a jury determination); and Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("The key fact pertinent to PRR sentencing—whether the defendant committed the charged offense within three years of release from prison—is not an ingredient of the charged offense. Rather, it relates to the fact of a prior conviction."). AFFIRMED. COHEN and NARDELLA, JJ., concur. Marcus Roland Maye, South Bay, pro se.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Lopez v. State, 135 So. 3d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
- Williams v. State, 143 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
- Kinard v. State, 337 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025)