MANUEL R. MAYOR, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA N. MAYOR, APPELLEE
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In this marriage dissolution appeal, the former husband, a medical doctor earning approximately $60,000 annually, challenged the trial court's awards of rehabilitative alimony, child support, the marital home as lump sum alimony, and attorney's fees and costs as an abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence of the husband's financial ability to pay and proper grounds for each award.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. There is sufficient evidence that the former husband has the financial ability to pay the awarded alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and costs, even during his cardiology fellowship. The award of the marital home to the former wife and the award of rehabilitative alimony were proper given her lower income and need for further education.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony when one spouse earns significantly less than the other and requires further education to i…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital home as lump sum alimony, even if the equity therein is relatively small.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Contrary to the former husband's arguments, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in this record to support the conclusion that the former husband has the financial ability to pay the alimony, child support, attorney's fees, and costs awarded by the trial court.”
Establishes the court's finding regarding the husband's financial capacity to meet all awards
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceManuel R. Mayor is a medical doctor who recently completed his internal medicine residency and is committed to a fellowship in cardiology. He filed a …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the former husband Manuel R. Mayor from a final judgment of marriage dissolution entered below after a non-jury trial. The former husband attacks the trial court awards of rehabilitative alimony, child support, the marital home as lump sum alimony, and attorney’s fees and costs as constituting an abuse of discretion. We disagree and affirm.
Contrary to the former husband’s arguments, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in this record to support the conclusion that the former husband has the financial ability to pay the alimony, child support, attorney’s fees, and costs awarded by the trial court. The former husband is a medical doctor who has just finished his residency in internal medicine; he filed a financial affidavit stating that his annual income is approximately $60,000 a year. Although he is committed to a future fellowship in cardiology, the record demonstrates that his annual income (including his “moonlighting” work) would be only slightly reduced during the fellowship period, and that he can afford the aforesaid awards during the said fellowship period. Beyond that, we conclude that there was otherwise an ample basis in this record for making the awards; moreover, there was no abuse of discretion in awarding the former wife the marital home which has but approximately $8,000 of equity therein. The former wife earns half of the income the former husband does and is in need of further education to improve her income potential; rehabilitative alimony was entirely proper in this case. We have not overlooked the former husband’s sundry arguments attacking each of the above awards, but are not persuaded thereby. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris,. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Robertson v. Robertson, 473 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); §§ 61.08 and 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1989).
Affirmed.
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Cited By
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Polley v. Polley, 588 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…d does not need assistance in becoming self-sufficient. He was fully capable of self-support at the end of the marriage and is employed. Furthermore, he has marketable skills. Vena v. Vena, 556 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); compare Mayor v. Mayor, 570 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (former spouse awarded rehabilitative alimony because further education was necessary to improve spouse’s income potential). The husband does not require redevelopment of previously acquired skills, and does not plan to obtain add…
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Larrauri v. Larrauri, 584 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…s entitled to reasonable rehabilitative alimony ... to enable her to have the same [educational] opportunity as the [h]us-band.” Blumberg v. Blumberg, 498 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 508 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1987); Mayor v. Mayor, 570 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). [*33] We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony. Finally, we reverse the attorney’s fee award; the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Martinez-Cid v. Recy Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Robertson v. Delphine M. Robertson, 473 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)