JUAN M. LARRAURI, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
DORIS LARRAURI, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-07-02
No. 90-601
Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
584 So. 2d 31 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this marital dissolution appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's lump sum alimony award to the wife as a permanent alimony award based on traditional alimony principles, and affirmed the reservation of jurisdiction for potential rehabilitative alimony, but reversed the attorney's fee award for failure to conduct a hearing and make requisite findings.


Holding

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent alimony to the wife in lump sum form based on traditional alimony principles, did not abuse its discretion in reserving jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony, but erred in awarding attorney's fees without conducting a hearing and making the requisite findings.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent alimony when it considers statutory factors, the recipient spouse's need, and the payor spouse's ability…

[2] A trial court may reserve jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony to enable a spouse to obtain educational opportunities comparable to the other spouse.

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Key Quotes

“Permanent alimony may be awarded in lump sum or in installments.”

Establishes that the trial court had discretion to award permanent alimony in the lump sum form used here

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Facts & Procedural History

The husband and wife were involved in a divorce proceeding. The trial court awarded the wife lump sum alimony and reserved jurisdiction to potentially…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The husband appeals and the wife cross-appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We affirm the final judgment, but reverse the attorney’s fee award.

First, we address the trial court’s lump sum alimony award to the wife. The husband characterizes the award as an equitable distribution of his medical degree based on his future earnings. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 451 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1984); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). We disagree. In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), the court recognized that the trial court may premise a lump sum alimony award on property distribution or on traditional alimony principles. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1986). In the case before us, the award was apparently intended as a permanent alimony award based on traditional alimony principles.1 Permanent alimony may be awarded in lump sum or in installments. § 61.08(1), Fla.Stat. (1989); see Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201. In making the award, the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in section 61.08(1), the wife’s demonstrated need and the husband’s present ability to pay. See Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201; Maddux v. Maddux, 495 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting alimony to the wife.

Second, we consider the court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony. See Barko v. Barko, 557 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Under the facts of the case before us, the trial court may make a determination that the “[wjife is entitled to reasonable rehabilitative alimony ... to enable her to have the same [educational] opportunity as the [h]us-band.” Blumberg v. Blumberg, 498 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 508 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1987); Mayor v. Mayor, 570 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony.

Finally, we reverse the attorney’s fee award; the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing and to make the requisite findings. Martin v. Martin, 561 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

The remaining point lacks merit.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

. The trial court’s characterization of the award is not dispositive on issue of the wife’s entitlement. Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) ("[Fjinal judgment contains an award of lump sum alimony payable in installments.... This award was evidently intended to constitute a rehabilitative alimony award.”); Muller v. Muller, 550 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“Although the final judgment stated the award of the husband’s interest in the home was given pursuant to an equitable distribution, it is apparent from the record that the award was intended as lump sum alimony.’’)


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Citator

Cited By

  • Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
    …er the dissolution. . The effective date of section 61.08(1) is July 1, 1991. This case was tried prior to that date. . Although no cases have specifically spoken to the retroactive application of section 61.08(1) and (2), in Larrauri v. Larrauri, 584 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), decided July 2, 1991 (one day after the effective date of section 61.08(1) and (2), the third district affirmed that portion of a judgment which awarded alimony based on consideration of the factors set forth in Canakaris v.…
  • Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …pport in this case was designated as lump-sum alimony, the trial court candidly concedes that the purpose of the award was essentially to provide temporary support. We will treat it as such, notwithstanding its designation. See Larrauri v. Larrauri, 584 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) n. l and cases cited therein. . Other cases determining that permanent alimony is appropriate in marriages of comparable length: Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Nelson v. Nelson, 588 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 2nd DCA…
  • Rubin v. Rubin, 624 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …al court did not abuse its discretion in determining the equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities, or in awarding the wife permanent periodic alimony. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Larrauri v. Larrauri, 584 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment in all respects except for paragraph number 12 determining that the wife is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs. We reverse that portion of the final judgment, and reverse t…

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