GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA ROBINSON AND ADRIAN A. ROBINSON, HER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
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GEICO appeals a judgment exceeding its uninsured motorist policy limits and the resulting attorney's fee award. The court holds that an insurer's liability is limited to policy limits absent bad faith findings, and that attorney's fees cannot be awarded as sanctions or enhanced beyond the contractual contingency fee agreement without proper justification.
An insurer's liability is restricted to policy limits absent a bad faith finding; attorney's fees as sanctions require evidence supporting factors for reasonableness; no multiplier may be applied to enhance fees beyond the contractual contingency fee agreement without specific justification such as market demands, risk of nonpayment, or societal benefit.
[1] An uninsured motorist carrier's liability is restricted to its coverage limits in the absence of a finding of bad faith.
[2] Attorney's fees may not be awarded as a sanction under the offer of judgment rule without evidence that the defendant acted unreasonably.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in the absence of a finding of "bad faith", an automobile insurance carrier's liability is restricted to the amount of its coverage limits”
Establishes the primary holding that insurers' liability cannot exceed policy limits without bad faith
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaria and Adrian Robinson sued their insurer, GEICO, for uninsured motorist benefits after an automobile accident. Their policy contained $20,000 in u…
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PER CURIAM.
Three issues are presented in this appeal: (1) Whether a judgment may be entered against an uninsured motorist carrier in an amount which exceeds the known policy limits in the absence of a finding of bad faith, (2) whether attorney’s fees may be awarded under the sanctions provision of the offer of judgment rule in the absence of evidence or findings that the defendant- insurer acted unreasonably, and (3) whether a multiplier may be applied to enhance an attorney fee award above the amount fixed by an unqualified forty-percent contingency fee agreement between the plaintiffs and their attorney.
We reverse the order denying GEICO’s motion to reduce the judgment in accordance with policy limits, and reverse the attorney’s fee award to the extent it exceeds the forty percent of recovery that was contractually agreed upon between the plaintiffs and their attorney.
Maria and Adrian Robinson brought this action against GEICO, their automobile insurance carrier, seeking benefits under the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. They alleged that they had been involved in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist, and were entitled to damages for personal injuries. GEICO answered, interposing defenses to both liability and the claimed amount of damages. Plaintiffs’ $15,000 offer of judgment was rejected. After discovery and an unsuccessful attempt to settle the case through mediation, the case proceeded to trial before a jury. It had been established in the record that the amount of uninsured motorist coverage available under the plaintiffs’ policy was limited to $20,000.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned an $88,000 verdict for the plaintiffs — an amount which exceeded the policy limits by $68,000. The trial court denied GEICO’s motion to limit the judgment to the policy limit, and entered a judgment for the full amount of the jury verdict. An appeal was taken from that judgment.
A second appeal was taken from an order awarding attorney’s fees. Subsequent to the entry of the $88,000 judgment, the plaintiffs moved for fees pursuant to sections 45.061 and 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, the “offer of judgment” statutes and rule. On a finding that the jury verdict exceeded plaintiffs’ offer of judgment by 125 percent, the court awarded fees in the amount of $26,000. No evidence was presented showing that rejection of the offer of judgment by GEICO was otherwise unreasonable so as to justify a sanction, or that the fee agreed upon by plaintiffs and their attorney should be enhanced due to particular circumstances.
First, in the absence of a finding of “bad faith”, an automobile insurance carrier’s liability is restricted to the amount of its coverage limits. Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Dixie Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 484 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Thus, the judgment against GEICO could not exceed $20,000, in the absence of a finding of bad faith. Second, a fee award as a sanction is not warranted under rule 1.442, in that there is no evidence which supports any of the ten relevant factors the court is permitted to consider in determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct. Third, there is no evidence which justifies the utilization of a multipler to enhance a fee, such as (1) that the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel, (2) that there was a risk of nonpayment which the attorney was unable to mitigate, or (3) that the private litigation was a benefit to society. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990). Finally, in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by an attorney and his client, except as a punitive measure. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985).
Based on a recovery of $20,000, which accords with the policy limits, the proper fee is $8,000. Our determinations, based on the evidence presented at the attorney’s fees hearings, do not preclude a separate bad faith action.
Reversed and remanded for further consistent proceedings.
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…inst State Farm. Absent a showing of bad faith, a judgment cannot be entered against an insurer in excess of its policy limits. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (UM case); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (UM case). This rule has been applied in cases where the policy limits were revealed and agreed to in the record in some form, usually during discovery. See Robinson, 581 So. 2d at 231; see also Dixie Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 484 S…
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vonnie B. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…iability to the amount of its policy limits, see Dixie Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 484 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). An exception exists in the case of a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the carrier. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). In this case there has not yet been a bad faith finding. In fact, the bad faith litigation did not ensue until after the trial court had entered its fee and cost judgment. Although we find no error in the trial court’s determina…
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Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Maida Solano Voigt, 971 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…its insurer for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits, at least in the absence of a judicial finding of bad faith. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. St. Godard, 936 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Gov’t [*242] Employees Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding trial court was required to grant relief from default judgment on the basis of mistake because judgment was entered in excess of…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- Quinn v. Truman Alan Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Williams v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Volusia Transit Mgmt., Inc., 484 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Dixie Ins. Co. & James R. Jessell v. Gennie Lewis, 484 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)