DAVID L. STEPHENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Stephens appealed the denial of post-conviction relief challenging his convictions and sentences for burglary and two counts of sexual battery. The court reversed the sexual battery sentences because they exceeded the statutory maximum of 40 years, but affirmed the convictions and the burglary sentence.
The sexual battery sentences are unlawful because they exceed the statutory maximum of 40 years for life felonies when the trial court opts for a term of years rather than a life sentence. The burglary sentence of seventy years is lawful because burglary is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Convictions are affirmed; sexual battery sentences are vacated and remanded for resentencing; burglary sentence is affirmed.
[1] A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence pursuant to a plea bargain.
[2] A sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute constitutes fundamental error that can be raised at any time.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence pursuant to a plea bargain.”
Establishes that illegal sentences cannot be enforced even when a defendant agrees to them in a plea agreement
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStephens pleaded nolo contendere to burglary with armed assault and two counts of sexual battery armed with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to three…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Life Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
David L. Stephens appeals the summary denial of his motion for post conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions and sentences for burglary and two counts of sexual battery. We reverse the sexual battery sentences because they exceed the statutory maximum. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s order. The appellant pleaded nolo contendere to burglary with an armed assault and two counts of sexual battery armed with a deadly weapon.1 He was sentenced within the guidelines and within the terms of the plea agreement to three concurrent terms of seventy years’ imprisonment followed by life probation. The recommended guidelines range was life, the permitted range, twenty-seven years to life. Nevertheless, we must reverse because the sexual battery sentences are unlawful.
The appellant has not waived the legality of his sentences even though he agreed to them and even though he failed to question them on appeal. See Stephens v. State, 595 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence pursuant to a plea bargain. Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1986), receded from on other grounds, Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988). A sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute is fundamental error which can be raised at any time. Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
The sexual batteries for which the appellant was adjudicated guilty are life felonies, punishable by a term of imprisonment for life or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. Section 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). When the trial court opts for a term of years instead of a life sentence, it may not impose a sentence longer than forty years. Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 682 (Fla.1991); Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d at 108. Moreover, the total duration of a split sentence must fall within the statutory maximum. Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Thus, the concurrent seventy-year terms of imprisonment followed by life probation for the two sexual batteries exceed the maximum provided by law.
The burglary sentence, however, is not excessive because it is a first-degree felony punishable by life. See Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d at 530. This felony is punishable by a “term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” Sections 810.02(2) and 775.-082(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). The appellant’s sentence of seventy years’ imprisonment followed by life probation for burglary is thus lawful, being within statutory limits.
Accordingly, we affirm all convictions, affirm the sentence for burglary, and vacate the sentences for sexual battery and remand for resentencing.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and BLUE, JJ., concur. . Sections 810.02(2)(a)(b) and 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1987).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Jones v. State, 872 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…02); Bowles v. Singletary, 698 So. 2d 1201 (Fla.1997). . See Shelton v. State, 739 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). . Kendrick v. State, 817 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Williams v. State, 782 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 805 So. 2d 811 (Fla.2001); Smith v. State, 654 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that there must…
-
Gonzales v. State, 816 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…a.1988); Hollybrook v. State, 795 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Sohl v. State, 710 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Even with a defendant’s consent, the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Collins v. State, 697 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). If the combination of probation and prison term ex…
-
Shelton v. State, 739 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…e reject the state’s argument because a defendant cannot be bound to an agreement to accept an illegal sentence. See Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dyer v. State, 629 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Stephens v. State, 627 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The trial court also erred in imposing a habitual felony offender sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for Shelton’s 1988 conviction. At the time of his 1988 offense, “ ... the guidelines statute had been construed t…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Mullins, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988)
- Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986)
- Kip Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Wilson v. State, 622 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)