DENNIS NOLAN BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
ELLA MEDLEY BROWN, APPELLEE
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This appeal concerns the proper venue for a dissolution of marriage proceeding in Florida. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the General Master's recommendation that Broward County was the proper venue, despite the marriage having been formed and the parties having resided together in Escambia County for eleven years before the wife relocated to Broward County.
The proper venue for a dissolution of marriage proceeding is the county where the marriage last existed as an intact union, which is determined by finding where the marriage partners called home. The General Master's finding that Broward County was the proper venue was supported by substantial competent evidence and was affirmed.
[1] In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, venue is proper in the county where the marriage last existed as an intact union.
[2] The determination of the county where the marriage last existed as an intact union is based on where the parties intended to remain married indefinitely or permanently.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To protect the beneficial purposes of both the marriage dissolution legislation and the venue statute, we are required to look, not for the county or the scattered counties where the breach may be said to have occurred, but to the single county where the marriage last existed.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for determining proper venue in dissolution proceedings—the county where the marriage last existed as an intact union.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant husband and appellee wife were married in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida on July 7, 1979, and resided together there for approximately …
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PER CURIAM.
This is a timely appeal from a non-final order denying appellant’s exceptions to the General Master’s recommendations and findings as to venue in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.
Appellant/husband and Appellee/wife were married in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida, on July 7, 1979, and resided there together for approximately eleven years, when appellee moved to Broward County in search of better employment. The couple have one child, a son, Derek, who is four years old. On September 21, 1990, appellee filed this suit for dissolution of marriage in Broward County, Florida. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss or transfer of venue, which was heard by a General Master, together with appellee’s motion for return of the child of the marriage.
The legal issue involved is the proper venue for this dissolution proceeding. On the subject of venue, section 47.011, Florida Statutes, provides that:
Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.
However, the correct construction and application of this section in a dissolution proceeding is set forth in Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977), where the court said:
To protect the beneficial purposes of both the marriage dissolution legislation and the venue statute, we are required to look, not for the county or the scattered counties where the breach may be said to have occurred, but to the single county where the marriage last existed. In that county the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended ... to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently. Ordinarily the court will recognize that county naturally, as do the parties themselves, and the venue problem will be no more difficult than finding where the marriage partners called home. Courts have long asked that simple question when determining the domicile of succession.
The evidence of the fact and intention of the parties vis-a-vis which county was their true residence is conflicting. We find substantial competent evidence in the record that supports the Master’s conclusion consistent with the rule set forth in Carroll and followed in numerous subsequent cases.1
Apparently the Master believed the testimony of the wife and thus we are unable to find reversible error demonstrated.
AFFIRMED.
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. . Goedmakers v. Goedmakers, 520 So. 2d 575 (Fla.1988); Beggs v. Beggs, 570 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Rakusin v. Rakusirt, 569 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Crawford v. Crawford, 415 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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Citator
Cited By
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Graham v. Graham, 648 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…t it did possess jurisdiction to award temporary child support based on the wife’s Broward County residence pursuant to section 61.10, Florida Statutes (1993). While Sumter County was the proper venue for the dissolution action, see Brown v. Brown, 592 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Broward County, as the residence of the wife, was also a proper venue for the action for separate maintenance. See Friedman v. Friedman, 383 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). A cause of action for separate maintenance unconnected…
Authorities Cited
- Myers v. State, 520 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1988)
- Vernell Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1977)
- Crawford v. Marianna Protsman Crawford, 415 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Rakusin v. Rakusin, 569 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Beggs v. Beggs, 570 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)