JULIO DIAZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Diaz was convicted of second-degree felony murder when his robbery confederate was shot by the intended victim; the court affirmed, holding that the confederate's unexpected use of a weapon during the robbery was not an intervening act relieving Diaz of liability under felony murder doctrine.
A defendant is liable for second-degree felony murder based on mere intent to participate in the underlying felony, and an accomplice's unexpected use of a weapon during the crime is not an intervening act that breaks the causal chain.
[1] Under felony murder doctrine, a defendant is liable for second-degree murder based on mere intent to participate in the underlying felony, and an accomplice's unexpected…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDiaz participated in an attempted robbery with confederates under an agreement that no weapons would be used. During the robbery, the intended victim …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Diaz was convicted of the second degree felony murder of one of his confederates in an attempted robbery who was shot dead by the intended victim. His sole appellate claim concerns the failure of the trial court to give an instruction on “independent act.” See Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985); Bryant v. State, 412 So. 2d 347 (Fla.1982); Ward v. State, 568 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). He contends the proposed charge was justified by evidence that the shooting took place only after the decedent himself pulled a pistol, contrary to the robbers’ previous agreement that no weapons would be used.
Because (a) the mere intent to participate in the underlying felony — here, robbery — is sufficient in this respect to support a second degree murder conviction, Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 232, 54 L.Ed.2d 158 (1977), and (b) Diaz was thus clearly liable for any acts, whether he knew of them ahead of time or not, committed by an accomplice in furtherance of that offense, Hall v. State, 403 So. 2d 1321 (Fla.1981), the decedent’s even unexpected use of a gun in the robbery was not an “intervening act” as a matter of law. See Gonzalez v. State, 503 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The requested instruction was therefore properly refused.
Affirmed.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Dell v. State, 661 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…iminal design.” Id. at 1306 (citations omitted). This court has held that “[the defendant] was thus clearly liable for any acts, whether he knew of them ahead of time or not, committed by an accomplice in furtherance of that offense.” Diaz v. State, 600 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1992). In support of his argument that the independent act instruction was required, Michael Dell relies primarily on the case of Rodriguez v. State, 571 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In that cas…
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Brown v. State, 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Diaz v. State, 600 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review denied, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1992); Limor v. Conli, 424 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 300, at 296 (1997)(“An appellant cannot urge review of an error that operates in the appellant’s favor.”).…
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Barron v. State, 990 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…ng an armed robbery of a 7-Eleven store by a co-perpetrator after the defendant had exited the store, was in furtherance of the robbery, not an independent act, as the shooting was an effort to eliminate an eyewitness to the robbery); Diaz v. State, 600 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)(“Diaz was [ ] clearly liable for any acts, whether he knew of them ahead of time or not, committed by an accomplice in the furtherance of that offense.”); Gonzalez v. State, 503 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(“[The defend…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1976)
- Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1984)
- Middleton v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 878 (U.S. 1977)
- Magda v. United States, 434 U.S. 878 (U.S. 1977)
- Hall v. State, 403 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1981)
- Bryant v. State, 412 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1982)
- THE Florida BAR v. Aronson, 412 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1982)
- Finney v. Georgia, 470 U.S. 1088 (U.S. 1985)
- Miller v. State, 568 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Thomas v. Maryland, 470 U.S. 1088 (U.S. 1985)