KYLE HOLMON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Kyle Holmon's convictions for shooting into an occupied vehicle and aggravated battery, finding that the state's evidence was legally insufficient due to critical inconsistencies in the only witness testimony supporting the charges.
The convictions must be reversed because the state's evidence was legally insufficient. The significant inconsistency between Vaughn's trial testimony that Holmon said 'shoot him' and his deposition testimony that Holmon may have said 'don't shoot him' renders the evidence legally insufficient to support the charges.
[1] A conviction must be reversed when the state's evidence is legally insufficient to support the charges.
[2] Inconsistent prior deposition testimony of a witness, admissible for impeachment and substantive evidence, can render the evidence legally insufficient.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The only evidence connecting appellant to the shooting was the testimony of Vaughn. On direct he testified that as Branch and appellant approached the car, he thought he heard appellant sáy to Branch, 'shoot him, shoot him.' On cross-examination, Vaughn admitted that on his pretrial deposition he had testified that it was possible that he had heard appellant say, 'don't shoot him, don't shoot him.'”
Establishes the critical factual inconsistency in the only evidence supporting the charges
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHolmon was involved in an altercation with several men. His friend Raymond Branch arrived with a pistol, fired shots, and then approached a vehicle wh…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Shooting Into An Occupied Vehicle cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant contends, and we agree, that his conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle (Count II) and aggravated battery (Count III) must be reversed because the state’s evidence was legally insufficient.
Appellant was involved in an altercation with several other men. His friend, Raymond Branch, drove up to the scene, pulled out a pistol, and started shooting. While the others scattered, Branch and appellant walked over to the vehicle in which the others had arrived and Branch fired several shots into the car. Two shots struck Robert Vaughn, the vehicle’s sole occupant. The two charges against appellant arose out of that incident, appellant being charged on the theory of aider and abettor. The only evidence connecting appellant to the shooting was the testimony of Vaughn. On direct he testified that as Branch and appellant approached the car, he thought he heard appellant sáy to Branch, “shoot him, shoot him.” On cross-examination, Vaughn admitted that on his pretrial deposition he had testified that it was possible that he had heard appellant say, “don’t shoot him, don’t shoot him.”
Vaughn’s prior deposition testimony, which met the requirements of section 90.801(2)(a) of the Florida Evidence Code, was admissible both as impeachment and as substantive evidence. Moore v. State, 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla.1984). This significant inconsistency in the only evidence to sup port the charges against appellant renders this evidence legally insufficient. See Coleman v. State, 592 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991); D.J.G. v. State, 524 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). See also, State v. Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1986); Hodge v. State, 315 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Majors v. State, 247 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971).
The judgment and sentence on each of these counts is reversed and as to them the appellant is ordered discharged.
ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995)…2d 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (videotaped deposition of child was properly admitted as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a) after child appeared at trial and recanted prior statements), dismissed, 666 So. 2d 142 (Fla.1995); Holmon v. State, 603 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (prior deposition testimony was admissible both as impeachment and as substantive evidence under section 90.801(2)(a)). Neither of those cases, however, discussed whether the depositions were taken for pre-trial discovery purpose…
-
Means v. State, 814 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…jury could draw a reasonable inference of guilt, we affirm. AFFIRMED. MINER, WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR. . We find no merit to Appellant’s claim that the trial court improperly admitted the child's statements. . See also Holmon v. State, 603 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), disapproved on other grounds by, State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla.1995); Coleman v. State, 592 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).…
Authorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Greene, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986)
- THE Florida BAR v. Nuccio, 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1984)
- Hodge v. State, 315 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Moore v. State, 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1984)
- Coleman v. State, 592 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- D.J.G. v. State, 524 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Gray v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 247 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Majors v. State, 247 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)