STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MUNRO MICHAEL MUNSON, APPELLEE
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Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a sentencing decision where the trial court improperly prevented the state from presenting evidence at sentencing by ruling that the state had waived its right to do so by failing to file a written response to a defendant's motion for downward departure. The court held that Rule 3.720(b) mandates that sentencing courts entertain submissions and evidence from all parties, and the state's failure to file a written response does not constitute a waiver of this right.
The state did not waive its right to present evidence at sentencing merely by failing to file a written response to the defendant's motion. Rule 3.720(b) imposes a mandatory duty on the sentencing court to entertain submissions and evidence by all parties relevant to the sentence, and this rule applies to both defense and state.
[1] A trial court errs by denying the state the right to present evidence relevant to sentencing under rule 3.720(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[2] Failure to comply with rule 3.720(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring the court to entertain submissions and evidence from the parties at a sentencing hear…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Entertain submissions and evidence by the parties which are relevant to the sentence”
The exact language of Rule 3.720(b) establishing the mandatory duty of sentencing courts to accept evidence from all parties
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMunson pleaded guilty to seven counts of obtaining property in return for worthless checks, five counts of grand theft, and one count of possession of…
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PER CURIAM.
Munson pled guilty to seven counts of obtaining property in return for worthless checks, five counts of grand theft, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Before sentencing, Munson filed a motion for a downward departure. The state did not respond in writing before the sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor explained that it was his understanding that if he did not respond, the defendant would make an open plea to the court.
The trial court determined that, by failing to respond to Munson’s motion, the state had elected to stand mute at sentencing and therefore could not present any evidence unless asked by the court. The state argues that the court improperly denied it the right under rule 3.720(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to present evidence relevant to sentencing. We agree.
The trial court insisted that the state had waived its right to present evidence under rule 3.720(b) when it failed to file a written response to Munson’s motion. We can find no authority to support this proposition. On the contrary, it ignores the precise language of the rule:
RULE 3.720 SENTENCING HEARING
As soon as practicable after the determination of guilt and after the examination of any presentence reports the sentencing court shall order a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the sentencing court shall:
(b) Entertain submissions and evidence by the parties which are relevant to the sentence, [e.s.]
Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720(b).
Florida courts have consistently held that the failure to comply with the imperative of rule 3.720(b) is reversible error. Mask v. State, 289 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla.1973); Hargis v. State, 451 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Tuthill v. State, 478 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1986); State v. Hohl, 431 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). As Judge Scheb pointed out in Hohl:
These authorities refer to cases where the defendants’ rights have been infringed; yet justice is due the accusor [sic] as well as the accused, and the rule comprehends the rights of both the state and defense.
431 So. 2d at 709.
It is equally clear that a reviewing court may, in a proper case, reverse on this ground even if the objecting party fails to make a proffer of the evidence excluded at trial, as was the case here. Tuthill, 478 So. 2d at 410; Hargis, 451 So. 2d at 552-53. In Cason v. Smith, 365 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), for example, the court overlooked the objecting party’s failure to make a proffer because “the trial judge effectively interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to complete any proffer they wished to make.” 365 So. 2d at 1043.
We believe that the judge here also effectively cut off state’s ability to make a proffer. In determining that the state elected to stand mute at sentencing, the following exchange took place:
COURT: So you have no standing in this case now. You are standing mute. STATE: Okay. He scores twelve to seventeen and I thought that means if I stand mute to his motion—
COURT: Standing mute means keeping your mouth shut.
The effect of the court’s ruling was to prevent the state from saying anything concerning defendant’s sentencing.
We therefore reverse and return the ease to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
DELL, GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ„ concur.
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Jehu Alex Compere v. State, 262 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…ncing hearings. That rule provides: “The court shall entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.720(b). Failure to comply with Rule 3.720(b) is reversible error. State v. Munson, 604 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). We have interpreted the rule to mean that “a criminal defendant prior to sentencing has the opportunity to make an unsworn statement to the sentencing judge in allocution.” Jean-Baptiste v. State, 155 So. 3d 1237,…
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Serna v. State, 264 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…the court to entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to sentencing. Failure to comply with this rule is reversible error. Compere v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D215 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 9, 2019) (citing State v. Munson, 604 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). “Under the rule . . . defendant[s] are entitled to make a statement to the court, as well as present matters in mitigation.” Chillingworth v. State, 846 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see Hodierne v. State, 141…
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Salatier Torres v. State, 658 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1983); Anderson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hargis v. State, 451 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Johnson Cason and Christine Cason v. Smith, 365 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- State v. Hohl, 431 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1974)
- Mask v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973)
- Tuthill v. State, 478 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)