H. JULIAN BROCK, APPELLANT,
v.
ASSOCIATES FINANCE, INC., AND RICHARD ROBBINS A/K/A R.N. ROBBINS, APPELLEES
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H. Julian Brock appealed a summary judgment dismissing his fraud action against Associates Finance, Inc. and Richard Robbins on statute of limitations grounds. The Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding when Brock discovered or should have discovered facts sufficient to support his fraud claim, making summary judgment improper.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding when Brock learned or should have learned of facts sufficient to support his fraud claim, and that such disputes preclude summary judgment in fraud cases as a matter of law.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when the moving party fails to conclusively demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even after drawing all reasonable in…
[2] All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party on a motion for summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To establish entitlement to a summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate conclusively that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, even after all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment.”
Establishes the standard for summary judgment that applies to this case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrock, the plaintiff, filed a fraud action against Associates Finance, Inc. and Richard Robbins. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing th…
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WEBSTER, Judge.
Appellant, plaintiff in the trial court, seeks review of an adverse summary final judgment entered in his fraud action. The trial court concluded that there existed no dispute as to any material fact; that appellant either knew or should have known more than four years before commencing this action of facts sufficient to put him on notice of the cause of action; and that, therefore, the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant argues that the trial court erred because the pleadings, discovery and affidavits on file establish that a genuine dispute exists as to when he either discovered or should have discovered facts sufficient to put him on notice that he had a cause of action against appellees for fraud. We agree and, accordingly, reverse.
To establish entitlement to a summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate conclusively that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, even after all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966). When reviewing the propriety of a summary judgment, our task is to determine from the record whether a genuine issue exists as to a material fact. “[A]ll doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party”; if “the slightest doubt remains,” a summary judgment cannot stand. Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 261 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).
In general, because of their nature, fraud claims are not susceptible to resolution by summary judgment. Sunchase Apartments v. Sunbelt Service Corp., 596 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Barrios v. Duran, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The same is true as to the issue of when the fraud was (or should have been) discovered for limitations purposes. See Hawkins v. Washington Shores Sav. Bank, 509 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
The trial court based its conclusion that appellant either knew or should have known of sufficient facts to put him on notice of his fraud claim more than four years before he filed this action on findings made in another case to which appellant had been a party. (Appellees had requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the court file in that and other cases to which appellant had been a party.) From the nature of the arguments made by appellees in the trial court and before us, it appears that appellees are relying upon either a res judicata or a collateral estoppel theory. However, there are two major flaws in such an approach.
Both res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses, which must be asserted as such in the answer. Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.110(d). See Byrd v. City of Niceville, 541 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla.1989); Gladstone v. Kling, 182 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). However, appellees did not assert either in their answer. Moreover, even if res judicata or collateral estoppel had been asserted as an affirmative defense, neither would be applicable. For res judicata purposes, this action and the prior action do not share an identity in the thing sued for, an identity of the cause of action or an identity of parties. E.g., West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., 595 So. 2d 92 (Fla.3d DCA), review denied, 604 So. 2d 489 (Fla.1992). For collateral estoppel purposes, neither the issues nor the parties are identical. E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla.1977).
Our review of the record satisfies us that when appellant either learned or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have learned of facts sufficient to put him on notice of his fraud claim is a disputed issue of fact; and that it is material. Accordingly, the summary final judgment is reversed, and this action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
BOOTH and SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Phillip and Delores Floyd v. Homes Beautiful Constr. Co., 710 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…is, of course, well-established that summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, even after all reasonable inferences have been drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Brock v. Associates Fin., Inc., 625 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In its summary judgment, the lower court noted that neither the Floyds nor Homes Beautiful asserted that the release was ambiguous. Rather, each side claimed that the release unambiguously supports their respective positions. D…
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Bowman v. Barker, 172 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…but questions of law.” Id. Moreover, “ ‘[A]ll doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party’; if ‘the slightest doubt remains,’ a summary judgment cannot stand.” Brock v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 625 So. 2d 135, 135-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (quoting Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 261 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)). Subject to these standards, we have carefully reviewed the parties’ detailed arguments and the record, and find that Appellant has demon…
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Stanley Marsh & Sons, Inc. v. Niagara Distribs., Inc., 670 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…summary judgment on appellant’s claims for conversion, misrepresentation and trespass. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture, 657 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Brock v. Associates Fin., Inc., 625 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment against appellant, Stanley Marsh & Sons, Inc., and remand this cause for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. GUNTHER, C.J., and DELL and KLEIN…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985)
- Vallen James Trumps v. State, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977)
- Eligio Barrios & Goldstone Co., N.V. v. Duran, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Bismark Diaz & Bis D. Corp. v. Piquette, 496 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 261 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., 595 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- D.L. Byrd v. City OF Niceville, 541 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Sunchase Apts. v. Sunbelt Serv. Corp., 596 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Kaydette Hawkins v. Wash. Shores Sav. Bank, 509 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)