RONALD J. HARPER, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Harper sought mandamus relief challenging the Florida Parole Commission's recalculation of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) after parole revocation. The court reversed in part, holding that the Commission erred by re-imposing a 60-month aggravating factor for handgun use that had already been considered in his initial PPRD.
The Commission erred in re-imposing the handgun aggravating factor because it had already been considered in the initial PPRD and the Commission may only modify a PPRD based on new information, institutional conduct, or exceptional circumstances. However, the 24-month extension for the second aggravating factor was valid as it was supported by new information and was facially valid, supported by the record, and authorized by statute and rule.
[1] A presumptive parole release date (PPRD) cannot be modified by the Florida Parole and Probation Commission based on a factor previously used in setting the initial PPRD,…
[2] The Florida Parole and Probation Commission may extend a presumptive parole release date based on new information if the reasons are facially valid, supported by the reco…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the law is clear that the Commission cannot change or modify a PPRD except for new information not available at the time of the initial interview, institutional conduct, or exceptional circumstances”
Establishes the legal standard governing when a PPRD can be modified after initial determination
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter Harper's parole was revoked, the Florida Parole Commission established a new PPRD of August 28, 1996. In calculating this date, the Commission i…
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ERVIN, Judge.
We reverse the order denying appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus. When the Florida Parole and Probation Commission established appellant’s presumptive parole release date (PPRD) as August 28, 1996, after his parole was revoked, it included 60 months for use of a handgun during the commission of the offense as an aggravating factor. This was error. The same factor had been used in setting appellant’s previous PPRD, and the law is clear that the Commission cannot change or modify a PPRD except for new information not available at the time of the initial interview, institutional conduct, or exceptional circumstances. §§ 947.16(5) & 947.173(3), Fla.Stat. (1991); Hester v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 619 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Williams v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Jackson v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 424 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Gaines v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 463 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla.1985).
As for the 24r-month extension given for the second aggravating factor based upon new information, appellant is not entitled to mandamus relief because the reasons are facially valid, supported by the record, and authorized by statute and rule. See Baker v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 384 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (“Absent a violation of any statute or rule, this Court can review no further under mandamus, as the writ will not lie in any review by this Court of the discretionary acts of the Commission.”).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions to grant the writ by ordering the Commission to recalculate appellant’s PPRD without any aggravation for the use of a firearm while committing the offense.
ALLEN, J., concurs.
LAWRENCE, J., specially concurs with opinion.
[*338] LAWRENCE, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur because I am bound by the doctrine of stare decisis. I feel in addition that the issue of public safety in paroling violent offenders1 can be adequately addressed by the Parole Commission’s broader discretion in establishing an effective2 parole release date. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n v. Paige, 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1985).
. Appellant was initially indicted for first-degree murder of his wife, but pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years of imprisonment in 1978. He escaped from prison in 1986, remaining at large for almost one year. He was paroled in 1990, and subsequently revoked for violation of his conditions of parole.
. Section 947.172, Florida Statutes (1991), governs the establishment of a presumptive parole release date; section 947.1745, Florida Statutes (1991), governs the establishment of an effective parole release date.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Barreiro v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review, 164 So. 3d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…of the circuit court’s review is, however, limited to determining whether the reasons provided by the Commission to support its decision are “facially valid, supported by the record, and authorized by statute and rule.” Harper v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 626 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citing Baker v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm’n, 384 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), which explained that “[ajbsent a violation of any statute or rule, this Court can review no further under mandamus, as the writ will n…
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Carter v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 894 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…ion. As to the claim requesting recalculation of petitioner’s presumptive parole release date, the petition is granted. The order of the circuit court is quashed and the cause remanded for reconsideration in light of Harper v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 626 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). VAN NORTWICK, POLSTON and THOMAS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n v. Paige, 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1985)
- Baker v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Jackson v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 424 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- In re Forfeiture OF ONE 1973 Mercedes 2 Door Convertible, 463 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Ramos v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Williams v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 515 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Hester v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 619 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- F.M. v. State, 619 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)