ROBERT ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robinson appeals his adult sentencing as a juvenile, arguing the trial court failed to adequately evaluate statutory criteria for imposing adult sanctions. The court reverses and remands, holding that trial courts must provide individualized written findings addressing each statutory factor before sentencing a juvenile as an adult.
The trial court erred and its sentence is reversed. Pursuant to Troutman v. State, the trial court must provide written individualized evaluation of how a particular juvenile fits within each statutory factor and set forth findings and reasons regarding each factor at sentencing. Robinson's preference for adult sentencing does not constitute an intelligent and knowing waiver of the right to such evaluation.
[1] A trial court must provide an individualized evaluation of each statutory criterion relating to the suitability of adult sanctions for a juvenile offender.
[2] A trial court's written order imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile must contain specific, individualized findings beyond reciting statutory language.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court must, in writing, address each of the factors enunciated in section 39.059(7), provide an individualized evaluation of how a particular juvenile fits within those factors and set forth findings and reasons with regard to each factor at the time of sentencing”
Establishes the binding requirement from Troutman for trial courts to provide detailed written analysis of statutory factors before imposing adult sanctions on juveniles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobinson, a juvenile, was charged with aggravated battery but pleaded no contest to simple battery after stabbing his girlfriend during a mutual alter…
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PARIENTE, Judge.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in sentencing defendant, a juvenile, as an adult without adequately evaluating each of the specific statutory criteria relating to suitability of adult sanctions pursuant to section 39.-059(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1993).
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated battery and pleaded no contest to the lesser charge of simple battery. The crime occurred two months before defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Apparently defendant stabbed his girlfriend and she stabbed him. The girlfriend had a history of violence, and she was on probation for stabbing someone else.
At the sentencing hearing, the representative for HRS recommended juvenile community control because it was defendant’s first offense and he had not had the benefit of the juvenile program. Although defendant made the statement that he would prefer probation in place of juvenile sanctions, his defense counsel objected because the criteria for adult sanctions were not met. The trial court’s oral pronouncements reflect its primary concern that because defendant would be nineteen, and outside the jurisdiction of HRS within eight months, there would be limited power to impose sanctions for violation of the community control program if defendant were sentenced as a juvenile. The trial court also stated that “in the court’s opinion he needs constant supervision.”
The trial court’s written order imposing adult sanctions was a 'form order reciting the statute verbatim. The only specific individualized findings contained in the order were as follows: “child 18 years of age, serious crime, limited supervise because of age — 8 months — needs adult supervision.”
While we are aware of the time demands imposed on the trial court by the exhaustive inquiry required by section 39.059(7)(c), we are compelled to reverse under the authority of Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993).1 Pursuant to Troutman, the trial court must, in writing, address each of the factors enunciated in section 39.059(7), provide an individualized evaluation of how a particular juvenile fits within those factors and set forth findings and reasons with regard to each factor at the time of sentencing. The trial court here did not, either in writing or orally, provide such an individualized evaluation.
Defendant’s offer to be sentenced as an adult at the time of the sentencing hearing certainly does not constitute an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to have a full evaluation of the specific statutory criteria before adult sanctions are imposed, assuming this right can even be waived. See State v. Veach, 630 So. 2d 1096 (Fla.1994); Troutman; Sirmons v. State, 620 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.1993); Berry v. State, 636 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Accordingly, the trial court’s order and sentence is reversed and this cause is remanded to conform with the dictates of Troutman.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur. . We note, however, that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1994, effective October 1, 1994, has overruled Troutman to the extent of the requirement of written justification of an adult sanction for a juvenile who is certified as an adult for trial. New section 39.059(7)(d) states:
Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions.
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Rico L. Cargle v. State, 770 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 2000)…(Supp.1994).8 As the Fourth District recognized, this statutory change “has overruled Troutman to the extent of the requirement of written justification of an adult sanction for a juvenile who is certified as an adult for trial.” Robinson v. State, 642 So. 2d 1204, 1205 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Although the statute no longer requires specific findings of fact, it does still require that “[a]ny decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing.” § 39.057(9)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995); see also Grayson v. State…
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Cemel Grayson v. State, 671 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…e, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993), and by subsection 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), that the trial court render specific findings of fact and address in writing all of the statutory criteria before imposing adult sanctions. See Robinson v. State, 642 So. 2d 1204 (Fla.4th DCA 1994). We have held that the amended statute should be applied retroactively to defendants who committed their offenses prior to 1994, [*856] but were sentenced after the effective date of the amendment. See Lutz v. State, 664 So. 2d 1…
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Smith v. State, 697 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…t by information charging burglary of a dwelling. This offense did not fall within the statutory provisions for sentencing a juvenile as an adult. § 39.022(5)(e)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992); State v. Berry, 647 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1994); Robinson v. State, 642 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Lunn v. State, 675 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); B.B. v. State, 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim. However, the trial court did not err in summ…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Sirmons v. State, 620 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Felice John Veach, 630 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1994)
- Fletcher Berry v. State, 636 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)