CEMEL GRAYSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a juvenile's conviction for manslaughter with a firearm but reversed and remanded the sentence because the trial court failed to comply with statutory requirements for imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile defendant, including obtaining required presentence reports and issuing a written decision.
The court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence because the trial court failed to obtain required presentence investigation reports from the Department of Corrections and Department of Juvenile Justice, and failed to issue a written decision to impose adult sanctions as mandated by statute.
[1] A trial court must comply with statutory provisions regarding the imposition of adult sanctions on a juvenile offender.
[2] Amended statutes governing the imposition of adult sanctions on juvenile offenders may be applied retroactively to offenses committed prior to the amendment but sentenced…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court did not sentence defendant in accordance with the amended statute”
Establishes the core violation in this case—non-compliance with the 1994 statutory amendments governing juvenile sentencing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Grayson was sixteen years old when he committed manslaughter with a firearm in 1993. He was tried as an adult and found guilty. At sentencin…
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PARIENTE, Judge.
We affirm the conviction but, in accordance with the state’s concession of error, we reverse defendant’s sentence because the trial court did not comply with the provisions of subsection 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), before imposing adult sanctions.
Defendant was a sixteen-year old juvenile at the time the crime was committed in 1993. Defendant was tried as an adult and found guilty of manslaughter with a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant on January 31, 1995, as an adult, to twenty years incarceration in the Department of Corrections with a recommendation of youthful offender status while defendant was a youthful offender. At the time of sentencing, defendant was seventeen.
Prior to sentencing, the legislature amended subsection 39.059(7) in 1994. The amended statute eliminates the requirement imposed by Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993), and by subsection 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), that the trial court render specific findings of fact and address in writing all of the statutory criteria before imposing adult sanctions. See Robinson v. State, 642 So. 2d 1204 (Fla.4th DCA 1994).
We have held that the amended statute should be applied retroactively to defendants who committed their offenses prior to 1994, but were sentenced after the effective date of the amendment. See Lutz v. State, 664 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla.4th DCA 1995); Thomas v. State, 662 So. 2d 1334, 1336 (Fla.1st DCA 1995). As the state concedes, the trial court did not sentence defendant in accordance with the amended statute.
Although eliminating the requirement imposed by Troutman, the amended statute still retains many of the provisions of the former statute. Subsection 39.059(7)(a) was significantly amended to provide that:
(7)(a) At the sentencing hearing the court shall receive and consider a presentence investigation report by the Department of Corrections regarding the suitability of the offender for disposition as an adult, a juvenile, or a youthful offender. The presen-tenee investigation report must include a comments section prepared by the Department of Juvenile Justice, with its recommendations as to disposition. This report requirement may be waived by the offender. Here, the trial court did not receive a report and recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the suitability of the offender for disposition as an adult, a juvenile, or a youthful offender, as required by subsection 39.057(7)(a). Additionally, the presentence investigation report did not include a comments section prepared by the Department of Juvenile Justice with its recommendations as to the disposition of defendant’s sentence, which was also required by that subsection.
Although the statute as amended no longer requires that the trial court set forth specific findings in writing, it nevertheless still mandates that the trial court consider the relevant statutory criteria to determine whether youthful offender or juvenile sanctions should be imposed. § 39.059(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). While a trial court’s decision to sentence a juvenile defendant as an adult is presumed appropriate, the statute still specifies that “any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing.” § 39.059(7)(d), Fla.Stat. (1995). In this case, there was no written decision to impose adult sanctions.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction, but reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Shawanna Dennis v. State, 696 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…Fla. 5th DCA 1982). As to the remaining issues, we find error only on the point the state concedes. The case must be remanded for the trial court to enter a written order reflecting its decision to sentence Dennis as an adult. See Grayson v. State, 671 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); § 39.059(7)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995). We affirm the conviction without prejudice to a Rule 3.850 motion and remand to the trial court for the entry of a written sentencing order. FARMER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. . We do not re…
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Rico L. Cargle v. State, 770 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 2000)…1205 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Although the statute no longer requires specific findings of fact, it does still require that “[a]ny decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing.” § 39.057(9)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995); see also Grayson v. State, 671 So. 2d 855, 855-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In light of the significant legislative changes to the statutory requirements of section 39.059(7)(d), the failure of the trial court to enter a separate written order sentencing the juvenile as an adult is not a fundame…
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Fuller v. State, 257 So. 3d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…tate , 678 So. 2d 486, 486 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (holding that a statute removing obligation of trial court to make findings of fact was procedural and applied retroactively, without discussing fact that statute had effective date); Grayson v. State , 671 So. 2d 855, 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (same); Thomas v. State , 662 So. 2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (same); Kenz , 116 So. 3d at 463-66 (holding that a procedural amendment altering the burden of proof in "slip and fall" cases applied retroactively to acti…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Thomas v. State, 662 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Lutz v. State, 664 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Robinson v. State, 642 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)