JESSIE LEE MACK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A substitute judge cannot impose sentence without a record showing exigent or unusual circumstances justifying the substitution.
Appellant was convicted, and a substitute judge imposed sentence because the original judge became ill. The record did not state why the substitute ju…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant, Jessie Lee Mack, appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine and driving with a suspended license. We affirm his conviction, but reverse and remand for resentencing because the record fails to show exigent or unusual circumstances, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c),1 for a judge other than the one who presided at trial to impose sentence.
Because the trial judge became ill while the jury was deliberating, a replacement judge was appointed to receive the jury’s verdict. At the sentencing hearing over a month later, the substitute judge presided. When appellant objected, the alternate judge did not state on the record why he, rather than the original judge, was pronouncing sentence. The record does not demonstrate that the replacement was based on necessity rather than mere convenience, which cannot justify sentencing by a substitute judge. Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Campbell v. State, 622 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We remand, directing that the original judge who presided at trial impose sentence upon appellant, unless it is established on the record that he is unavailable under the rule. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BARFIELD and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . That rule provides:
In those cases in which it is necessary that sentence be pronounced by a judge other than the judge who presided at trial or accepted the plea, the sentencing judge shall not pass sentence until the judge becomes acquainted with what transpired at the trial, or the facts, in-eluding any plea discussions, concerning the plea and the offense.
We find no error in regard to the judge's preparation for sentencing. Castor v. State, 351 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), aff'd, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978).
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Aleño Santana Madrigal v. State, 683 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…aring, ease law establishes that, even without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, reversible error [*1097] occurs where the record does not show that such substitution of judges was “necessary” or dictated by an “emergency.” See Mack v. State, 643 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Lawley, 377 So. 2d at 824-26. Mere convenience is not a sufficient justification to permit a substitute judge to sentence a defendant. Mack, 643 So. 2d at 701; Lawley, 377 So. 2d at 825. In the instant ease, the record does not…
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Baskin v. State, 898 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…a defendant unless the record shows that the substitution of judges is necessary or dictated by an emergency. Clemons v. State, 816 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Madrigal v. State, 683 So. 2d 1093, 1096-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Mack v. State, 643 So. 2d 701, 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824, 824-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Where sentence is improperly imposed by a successor judge, the sentence will be reversed even without a specific showing of how the sentencing by the successor ju…
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Ingram v. State, 977 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…t unless the record [*607] shows that the substitution of judges is necessary or dictated by an emergency.” Baskin v. State, 898 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Mere convenience cannot justify sentencing by a substitute judge. See Mack v. State, 643 So. 2d 701, 701 '(Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Further, where a defendant is sentenced by a successor judge in the absence of a demonstration of necessity or emergency, he or she is entitled to reversal of the sentence imposed “even without a showing of prejudice to th…
Authorities Cited
- Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978)
- Lawley v. State, 377 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Campbell v. State, 622 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Castor v. State, 351 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)