JUSTICE ANTHONY NEAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Neal challenged his consecutive sentences and various costs and fees imposed by the trial court in two consolidated direct criminal appeals. The appellate court affirmed the imposition of certain costs but reversed the consecutive sentences as exceeding guideline maximums, the per-count cost assessments, and the public defender's lien imposed without notice of the right to contest.
The court held that the consecutive sentences of 5½ years exceeded the guideline maximum of 4½ years and must be vacated; the law library and Gulf Coast Criminal Justice Assessment costs were properly imposed; costs may not be assessed on a per-count basis but only per-case; and a public defender's lien cannot be imposed without notice and an opportunity to contest its amount.
[1] Consecutive sentences that impermissibly exceed the maximum sentence permitted by sentencing guidelines must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing within the…
[2] Costs established by a special act published in the Laws of Florida may be lawfully imposed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the maximum permitted guidelines sentence for the offenses of which appellant had been convicted is 4½ years. Therefore, the two consecutive sentences imposed which, together, add up to 5½ years, must be vacated”
Establishes that consecutive sentences exceeded guideline maximums and must be vacated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of offenses and sentenced to two consecutive sentences totaling 5½ years. The trial court imposed costs including $4.00 for la…
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PER CURIAM.
In these two consolidated direct criminal appeals, appellant raises four issues: (1) whether the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court impermissibly exceeded the maximum sentence permitted by the guidelines; (2) whether the trial court impermissi-bly imposed a $4.00 cost for the law library and a $2.00 cost for the Gulf Coast Criminal Justice Assessment; (3) whether the trial court impermissibly imposed costs on a per-count basis; and (4) whether the trial court impermissibly imposed a public defender’s lien without advising appellant of his right to contest its amount. We affirm the imposition of costs associated with the law library and the Gulf Coast Criminal Justice Assessment. In all other respects, we reverse.
As the state correctly concedes, the maximum permitted guidelines sentence for the offenses of which appellant had been convicted is 4½ years. Therefore, the two consecutive sentences imposed which, together, add up to 5½ years, must be vacated, and the cases remanded for resentencing within the guidelines. Kelly v. State, 616 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
The state correctly argues that it was not error to impose costs attributable to the law library and the Gulf Coast Criminal Justice Assessment, as those costs were established by a special act which was published in the Laws of Florida. Ch. 69-835, § 7, at 106, Laws of Fla.; ch. 89-521, § 7, at 405, Laws of Fla. See Hunter v. State, 651 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). However, the state concedes that it was error to assess costs on a per-count basis. E.g., Renaud v. State, 660 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Hunter, 651 So. 2d at 1260. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to assess costs on a per-case basis only.
This court has repeatedly reversed a public defender’s lien imposed without informing the defendant of the right to contest its amount. E.g., Bryant v. State, 661 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); L.A.D. v. State, 616 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 624 So. 2d 268 (Fla.1993). Accordingly, the imposition of a public defender’s lien is vacated. On remand, a lien may again be imposed, provided that appellant is given notice and an opportunity to contest its amount.
In summary, we vacate the sentences, costs and public defender’s lien imposed, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
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Brenton McNeil v. State, 215 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2017)…kles v. State, 44 So. 3d 653, 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Webster v. State, 705 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Van Vorous v. State, 696 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Seeker v. State, 674 So. 2d 853, 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Neal v. State, 669 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stephens v. State, 667 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Smith v. State, 661 So. 2d 378, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Renaud v. State, 660 So. 2d 408, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Nguyen v. State, 655 So. 2d 1249, 1249 (Fla. 1s…
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Brenton McNEIL v. State, 162 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…on and should have imposed the costs only once for the entire case.”); Seeker v. State, 674 So. 2d 853, 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Because the trial court imposed costs on a per count basis, however, we strike the duplicative costs.”); Neal v. State, 669 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Stephens v. State, 667 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Smith v. State, 661 So. 2d 378, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“[C]osts must be imposed on a per-case basis.”); Renaud v. State, 660 So. 2d 408, 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…
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Brown v. State, 681 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…the public defender, the court did not provide notice to appellant of his right to contest the amount. Accordingly, this fee is stricken. L.AD. v. State, 616 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 624 So. 2d 268 (Fla.1993). Accord Neal v. State, 669 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In addition, the written order does not contain a citation of statutory authority for imposition of the public defender fee or for the $2 for the County Law Enforcement Training Fund. Bryant v. State, 661 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st D…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of L.A.D. v. State, 616 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Bryant v. State, 661 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Hunter v. State, 651 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Nisa Vichaikul v. S.C.A.C. Enters., Inc., 616 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Jacques H. Renaud v. State, 660 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)