GARY DEAN SIKES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sikes appeals the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion challenging consecutive habitual offender sentences as untimely. The court affirms, holding that the two-year window to file such motions began when Hale v. State was announced on October 14, 1993, not when the U.S. Supreme Court denied review, and Sikes's motion filed in February 1996 fell outside that period.
The two-year period began on October 14, 1993, when the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in Hale, not on any later date. Because Sikes filed his motion on February 12, 1996—more than two years after October 14, 1993—it was untimely and the trial court properly denied it.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief based on a change in law is timely if filed within two years of the date the change was announced.
[2] The two-year period for filing a postconviction motion challenging consecutive habitual offender sentences for a single criminal episode begins on the date the Florida Su…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a prisoner has two years from the time a fundamental change is "announced" in which to file for relief pursuant to rule 3.850”
Establishes the governing standard for timing of Rule 3.850 motions based on changes in law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSikes pleaded nolo contendere to burglary and grand theft and was sentenced as a habitual offender on August 5, 1993, to 20 years total (15 for burgla…
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
Gary Dean Sikes appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, that requested a correction of consecutive habitual offender sentences. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. We affirm because the change of law in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), was “announced” on October 14,1993, more than two years before this motion was filed.
Mr. Sikes pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced as a habitual offender on August 5, 1993, for burglary and grand theft. The trial court sentenced Mr. Sikes to a total of twenty years’ imprisonment, fifteen years for burglary and five consecutive years for grand theft. We note that the trial court could have sentenced Mr. Sikes, as a habitual offender, to thirty years’ imprisonment for the burglary because it is a second-degree felony. Mr. Sikes did not appeal his judgments and sentences.
About two months later, on October 14, 1993, the Supreme Court of Florida issued its decision in Hale, holding that multiple habitual offender sentences arising from a single criminal episode must be imposed concurrently. The supreme court denied rehearing in Hale on February 9, 1994. Thereafter, Mr. Hale petitioned for certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. That Court denied review on October 3,1994, Hale v. Florida, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 278, 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994), and denied rehearing on December 12,1994, Hale v. Florida, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 686, 130 L.Ed.2d 617 (1994).
The Supreme Court of Florida later held that there would be a two-year window period following Hale in which criminal defendants could challenge the imposition of consecutive habitual offender sentences for multiple offenses arising from a single episode. State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995).
Mr. Sikes waited until February 12, 1996, to mail his motion for postconviction relief to the trial court. That court denied the motion as untimely, and Mr. Sikes appealed. The issue, thus, is whether the two-year period announced in Callaway runs from the United States Supreme Court’s denial of review or from some earlier date.
We agree with the Fifth District’s statement in Gentry v. State, 659 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), that the two-year period began on October 14, 1993, when the Supreme Court of Florida issued its decision in Hale.
Rule 3.850(b) does not explicitly state when a “fundamental constitutional right” is “established,” or how long thereafter a prisoner has to seek relief. In Adams v. State, 543 So. 2d 1244 (Fla.1989), the supreme court explained that a prisoner has two years from the time a fundamental change is “announced” in which to file for relief pursuant to rule 3.850. In Adams, the relevant change in the law was announced in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). The supreme court relied upon the date the United States Supreme Court issued its decision to begin the two-year period. There is no reason why a later date would be applicable in this case.
Mr. Sikes suggests that he should have a period equal to Mr. Hale’s in which to file for relief on this change in the law. Because Mr. Hale received relief on this issue in his direct appeal, he had no need for postconviction relief on this issue. We recognize that, if Mr. Hale sought postconviction relief on another issue, his two-year period under rule 3.850 would have started on the date his judgment and sentence became “final,” not on the date when a new rule of law was “announced.” Mr. Hale’s judgment and sentence were not final until the supreme court issued its mandate and remanded his case to the trial court.
Thus, the trial court in Mr. Hale’s case would not have had jurisdiction to entertain a postconvietion motion on October 14, 1993, because his case was still pending in the supreme court. See State v. Meneses, 392 So. 2d 905 (Fla.1981).
The trial court in Mr. Sikes’ case, however, had jurisdiction to review such a motion at all times beginning on October 14,1993.
Affirmed.
FRANK, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
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Citator
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Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999)…rs of August 16, 1995, the date of our mandate in Callaway. Our decision also renders timely the motions of the defendants in Jackson v. State, 707 So. 2d 339 (Fla.1st DCA 1998), Dukes v. State, 703 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1st DCA 1997), and Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla.2d DCA 1996),7 all or whom also filed their motions within two years of the Court’s mandate in Callaway. We accordingly quash the decision below and remand to the district court with directions that the trial court consider the merits of Dixon’…1 / 2
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Hill v. State, 696 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…e in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 909, 115 S.Ct. 278, 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994), was announced on October 14, 1993, when the opinion was issued, and not on February 9, 1994, when rehearing was denied. Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Under circumstances where prospectivity was not a factor, both this court and the Fifth District applied Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1990), to “pipeline” cases when Pope was still pending on rehearing in the supreme court.…
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Griffin Dukes v. State, 703 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…o. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added). However, when a ruling is held to apply retroactively to allow for postconviction relief, we find no authority for Dukes’ reasoning. We adopt the reasoning by the Second and Fifth Districts in Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and Gentry v. State, 659 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), that the two years for filing a Hale claim by 3.850 motion, commenced on October 14, 1993, the date the Hale opinion was issued. We recognize, that the Third District has h…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (U.S. 1987)
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995)
- In re Amendment TO Fla. Rules OF Jud. Administration-Rule 2.125(b)(1), 543 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1989)
- State v. Meneses, 392 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1981)
- Gentry v. State, 659 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)