GRIFFIN DUKES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Griffin Dukes appealed the denial of his postconviction 3.850 motion raising a Hale claim as untimely. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial and certified three questions of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court regarding when the two-year filing period commences for retroactive Hale claims and whether consecutive habitual felony offender sentences are illegal under Rule 3.800(a).
The two-year filing period for a Hale claim under Rule 3.850 commences on October 14, 1993, the date the Hale opinion was issued, not from the date the U.S. Supreme Court denied rehearing. Dukes' motion was untimely under this standard and under the alternative dates proposed by other districts. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, though it certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the proper commencement date and whether consecutive habitual felony sentences are illegal under Rule 3.800(a).
[1] A two-year period for filing a postconviction relief motion under Hale commences on the date the Hale opinion was issued when the ruling is applied retroactively.
[2] A postconviction relief motion seeking the retroactive benefit of Hale, filed more than two years after Hale but within two years of the decision in Callaway, may be deem…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the supreme court has made it clear that "when a ruling is prospective only, the ruling does not take effect until the time for rehearing has run"”
Establishes the principle distinguishing prospective from retroactive rulings and when they take effect for purposes of timeliness
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDukes filed his postconviction motion on September 30, 1996, approximately two years and eleven months after the Hale decision was announced on Octobe…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Griffin Dukes (Dukes) challenges an order by which his posteonvietion motion, raising a Hale1 claim, and filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, was denied as untimely. We affirm and certify to the supreme court, questions of great public importance.
The supreme court held in State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995), that Hale would be applied retroactively and that relief must be sought within two years of the decision in Hale. Dukes filed his motion on September 30,1996, approximately two years and eleven months after the Hale decision was announced by the Florida Supreme Court. He argued the two years should run from the date the United States Supreme Court denied rehearing of its denial of certiorari review, and therefore his motion was timely.
The supreme court has made it clear that “when a ruling is prospective only, the ruling does not take effect until the time for rehearing has run”. Henderson v. State, 698 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added). However, when a ruling is held to apply retroactively to allow for postconviction relief, we find no authority for Dukes’ reasoning. We adopt the reasoning by the Second and Fifth Districts in Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and Gentry v. State, 659 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), that the two years for filing a Hale claim by 3.850 motion, commenced on October 14, 1993, the date the Hale opinion was issued. We recognize, that the Third District has held in Dixon v. State, 697 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997),2 that the two years runs from the date the Florida Supreme Court denied rehearing. Although Dukes’ motion would still be untimely under either of these dates, and we find no authority for using the date Dukes advocates, we certify the following question:
I. WHEN DOES THE TWO YEAR PERIOD COMMENCE, FOR FILING A 3.850 CLAIM UNDER HALE, WHICH HAS BEEN HELD IN CALLAWAY, TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY FOR PURPOSES OF RELIEF BY 3.850 MOTION?
Dukes argued in the alternative, that the two years for filing a Hale claim commenced on the date the Callaway decision was issued, because it was not until this date that it was announced that Hale would be applied retroactively. Since it is clear that Callaway provides the two years runs from the Hale decision, we reject this argument. Nevertheless, because there was less than three months following Callaway within which to file a timely Hale claim, we certify the following second question:
II. SHOULD A 3.850 MOTION SEEKING THE RETROACTIVE BENEFIT OF HALE, FILED MORE THAN TWO YEARS AFTER HALE, BUT WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE DECISION IN CALLAWAY, BE DEEMED TIMELY?
Dukes further argued, that his motion could be treated as a 3.800(a) motion, but failed to allege any of his sentences are illegal. The record shows that each of his sentences do not exceed the statutory maximum, and therefore, based upon our decision m Richardson v. State, 698 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (criminal division en banc), we affirm the trial court’s denial of Dukes’ motion under 3.800(a). As in Richardson, we certify the following third question to the supreme court:
III. ARE CONSECUTIVE HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER SENTENCES FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES ARISING FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE, PROSCRIBED BY HALE V. STATE, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), ILLEGAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 3.800(a), WHEN NO SINGLE SENTENCE EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM PROVIDED BY LAW?
AFFIRMED.
BARFIELD, C.J., JOANOS, J., and SMITH, Senior Judge, concur. . Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993) (proscribing consecutive habitual offender sentences for offenses arising from the same criminal episode), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 909, 115 S.Ct. 278, 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994).
. Relying on dicta in a footnote from a Second District Court opinion. Lock v. State, 668 So. 2d 1081, n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), although inconsistent with the Second District’s holding in Sikes, supra.
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Cited By
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Dixon v. State, 730 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1999)…3.850 motion timely because it was filed within two years of August 16, 1995, the date of our mandate in Callaway. Our decision also renders timely the motions of the defendants in Jackson v. State, 707 So. 2d 339 (Fla.1st DCA 1998), Dukes v. State, 703 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1st DCA 1997), and Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla.2d DCA 1996),7 all or whom also filed their motions within two years of the Court’s mandate in Callaway. We accordingly quash the decision below and remand to the district court with direct…1 / 2
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Jackson v. State, 707 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…of.the record conclusively refuting appellant’s allegations. Appellant also contends that he was sentenced to consecutive habitual offender sentences in violation of the rule set forth in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993). In Dukes v. State, 703 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), this court adopted the view that “the two years for filing- a Hale claim by 3.850 motion, commenced on October 14, 1993, the date the Hale opinion was issued.” Appellant here filed his motion in May, 1996, beyond the two year pe…
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Shepherd v. State, 713 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…urt to move for post-conviction relief. Thus, applicants for Hale relief, who were otherwise time-barred, had a deadline of October 14, 1995, to file a rule 3.850motion. See Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); see also Dukes v. State, 703 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The trial court, pointing out Shepherd’s rule 3.850filing date of September 17, 1997, declared his claim untimely, and pointed out that he could have raised the matter on plenary appeal. Shepherd appealed his conviction and sen…
Authorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1995)
- Snead v. United States, 513 U.S. 909 (U.S. 1994)
- Blanc v. United States, 513 U.S. 909 (U.S. 1994)
- Richardson v. State, 698 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Henderson v. State, 698 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1997)
- Lock v. State, 668 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Gentry v. State, 659 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Sikes v. State, 683 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Dixon v. State, 697 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)