ROBERT LAMAR EVINS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Robert Evins appeals the revocation of his probation and resulting three-and-a-half-year sentence, arguing that the sentence was illegal because convictions for cocaine possession and resisting arrest—which were reversed on appeal—may have been used to calculate his sentence length. The court reverses and remands for reconsideration, holding that if the reversed convictions were scored on the sentencing scoresheet, the sentence must be corrected.
The court holds that the record is unclear whether the battery charge and reversed convictions were the primary basis for revocation and sentencing. Therefore, the case must be remanded to determine whether the reversed convictions were scored on the sentencing scoresheet; if so, the sentence must be corrected. The trial court may reinstate the same sentence upon remand if based solely on the remaining violations.
[1] A defendant's probation may be revoked based on independent violations, even if one of the alleged violations is later reversed on appeal.
[2] A sentence imposed upon revocation of probation must be corrected if the reversed conviction was considered in determining the length of that sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is unclear from this record whether or not the battery charge was the primary consideration in revoking probation”
Establishes the basis for remand—uncertainty about whether the revocation was primarily based on a charge later determined to be invalid.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEvins pleaded guilty to robbery and battery on a law enforcement officer and received four years of probation. He violated probation by failing to rep…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Conviction Reversal cases and more on FLexlaw
BARKDULL, Senior Judge.
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to charges of robbery and battery on a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to four years of probation. He subsequently violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer, leaving Dade County without the consent of his probation officer and committing a battery on a law enforcement officer. The trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to three and one-half years of incarceration.
The defendant filed a rulé 3.800(a) motion1 to correct illegal sentence and alleged that his sentence was illegal because his convictions for possession of cocaine and resisting arrest without violence were reversed on appeal to the Fifth District. Turner v. State, 674 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Apparently these convictions arose out of the same incident for which the defendant was originally charged with battery on a law enforcement officer.
The state asserts that although the battery charge was considered in the probation revocation proceeding, his probation was revoked for other technical violations and thus the revocation is still proper. The state has not, however, supplied this court with the defendant’s scoresheet or otherwise addressed the issue of whether the convictions that were reversed were considered in determining the length of the three and one-half year sentence that was imposed upon revocation of probation.
While it is true that the trial court could have revoked the defendant’s probation solely for the two other violations charged, see e.g., Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Jackson v. State, 546 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); McPherson v. State, 530 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); May v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Sparks v. State, 453 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), it is unclear from this record whether or not the battery charge was the primary consideration in revoking probation. And although it appears that the battery may not have been scored or otherwise considered in determining the length of the defendant’s sentence upon revocation, we are unable to be certain without the scoresheet.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the defendant’s revocation of probation and sentence.
The trial court may still decide to revoke probation based on the remaining violations and impose the same sentence, see Eullett v. State, 507 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), but if the conviction that was later reversed was listed on the scoresheet, then the defendant’s sentence must be corrected accordingly. See Brown v. State, 661 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)(reversal of conviction which had been scored required resentencing); Valdez v. State, 624 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Which we treat as a 3.850 motion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bernard v. State, 769 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…d neglect charge may have influenced the sentencing decision, we vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentenc-ing. On remand, the trial court may still decide to impose the same sentence based on the remaining violations. See Evins v. State, 690 So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Jess v. State, 384 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Reversed and remanded with directions. . This agency is now the Department of Children and Families.…
-
Wells v. State (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)…ered by the court, so we cannot affirm a violation of Condition 9. The court below, based upon the violation of curfew alone, would have been and remains within its discretion to revoke probation and impose the same sentence. See Evins v. State, 690 So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Eullett v. State, 507 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Because it is unclear from the record whether the court would have done so without the second violation—indeed, the primary focus of the discussion at the hearing rela…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- McPHERSON v. State, 530 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Lambert Keith Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Ranzel Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Turner v. State, 674 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Pritchard v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- MAY v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Jackson v. State, 546 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Sparks v. State, 453 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Brown v. State, 661 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Valdez v. State, 624 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)