RANZEL DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that probation cannot be revoked solely on hearsay evidence and remanded for reconsideration when some grounds were insufficient.
Appellant was charged with seven probation violations and found guilty of two: failure to file reports and failure to pay supervision costs. The evide…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
While serving two years’ probation appellant was charged with seven violations thereof. At the hearing thereon, the court heard evidence regarding two of the violations, failure to file monthly reports and failure to pay the costs of supervision. The trial court found appellant guilty of violating both conditions and sentenced him to two years in prison.
It is conceded on appeal that the only evidence to support the probation violation of failure to pay the cost of supervision was hearsay. Since probation may not be revoked based solely upon hearsay evidence, Curry v. State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), that ground should be excised from the written order of revocation, together with grounds III, IV, V, VI, and VII, which were also set forth therein, because these grounds were not heard by the court. This leaves us in doubt as to whether the trial court would have revoked appellant’s probation for the one technical violation and, if so, whether the sentence would be the same. Although failure to file monthly reports is a sufficient ground for revocation, May v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), because we are in doubt, we choose to follow respectable authority 1 remanding for further consideration by the trial court under like circumstances.
Accordingly, the cause is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the trial court with directions to eliminate from his written order grounds II through VII. We further request that' the trial judge reconsider the matter in the light of this opinion and resentence appellant as he deems proper, including the same sentence previously given if he is so disposed.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
LETTS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Aaron v. State, 400 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Clemons v. State, 388 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Jess v. State, 384 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
LETTS, Judge,
specially concurring.
I specially concur because I do not believe the majority opinion stresses that the trial judge, upon remand, may come to the same conclusion as he did before.
I am also apprehensive that it appear we are suggesting that monthly reports are but “technical” niceties. True, they involve some paper work compliance by the supervisor and certainly, a failure to report does not rise to the level of an armed robbery. Nonetheless, by definition, probation envisions supervision and control by the department of corrections. Among other normal requirements of this supervision and control, is the duty to report to the probation supervisor [see section 948.-03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1983) ]. Without such reporting, coupled with the monster case load endured by probation officers, there will be, as a practical consequence, no control and no supervision — ergo nonexistent probation.
Accordingly, I view failure to report as a serious violation of probation regardless of any technicalities involved in the manner of its fulfillment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2002)…terms and conditions of his or her probation. See Thorpe v. State, 642 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Stevens v. State, 599 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). We agree with Judge Letts’ statements in his specially concurring opinion in Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Letts, J., specially concurring), that probation reports are not merely technical niceties and the failure to report is a serious violation of the privilege of probation. The probation system operates under a tremendous workload…
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Kiess v. State, 642 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…is special condition. While hearsay evidence is admissible in probation revocation proceedings, hearsay alone is insufficient to establish a violation of a condition of probation. Arnold v. State, 497 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Combs v. State, 351 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The order of probation did not prohibit “contact” with defendant’s stepchildren. We note, however, that the affidavit of violation of probation and order revoking probation…
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Brown v. State, 659 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…f two other violations, we must reverse because we can neither determine whether the trial court would have revoked appellant’s probation for the other two violations alone, nor conclude whether his sentence would have been the same. Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). In addition, the written order revoking probation recited six violations; but the court orally found appellant guilty of only three violations. Therefore, after remand, the order should be corrected so that it is not inconsiste…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bennie Jess, Jr. v. State, 384 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Clemons v. State, 388 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Aaron v. State, 400 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Pritchard v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- MAY v. State, 472 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Curry v. State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Robbins v. Blackstone Valley Nat'l Bank, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)