R.P., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Juvenile's disposition order for petit theft was reversed because the commitment period was not specifically limited to sixty days, the maximum adult sentence for that offense, rather than being left indefinite until his nineteenth birthday.
A juvenile disposition order must specifically state the maximum term of commitment based on the adult sentence for the offense, not leave it indefinite until the juvenile reaches a certain age.
[1] A juvenile disposition order must specify the maximum term of commitment based on the corresponding adult sentence for the offense rather than stating an indefinite commi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceR.P., a juvenile, was adjudicated guilty of petit theft and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for an indefinite period until his ninetee…
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POLEN, Judge.
R.P., a juvenile, appeals from a disposition order adjudicating him guilty of petit theft and committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice “for an indefinite period but no longer than the child’s nineteenth (or twenty-first for SHO) birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment an adult may serve, whichever comes first.” We reverse and remand for the trial court to correct the disposition order as the commitment should have been specifically limited to no more than sixty days which is the maximum term an adult can serve for the same offense. See M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (order committing juvenile to a level 8 program for “an indeterminate period of time, not longer than: a) nineteenth birthday; b) the maximum sentence allowable by law ...” should have specified a commitment for one year, the maximum sentence for simple battery, so his sentence would not be construed as running until his nineteenth birthday); A.S. v. State, 677 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (recognizing that a correction was needed in a disposition order that was ambiguous regarding the maximum allowable sentence for misdemeanor battery, and that in accordance with M.S. the term of the sentence should be set out specifically to avoid confusion).
KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…time no longer than a specific birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment is error because such language could allow the sentence to be construed as running longer than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense. See R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also J.A.L., 778 So. 2d at 409. Accordingly, we affirm L.W.G.’s adjudication of delinquency, but remand for the entry of two separate disposition orders, one for each offens…
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I.B. v. State, 816 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…allow the sentence to be construed as running longer than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense." L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing J.A.L. v. State, 778 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). These cases suggest that the trial court should designate that the commitment should be for the shorter period. Since we find that the disposition must be corrected for other r…
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Gaines v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 743 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…ce concerning a prisoner's parole.” . Several recent cases also show that the judge is actively serving as a judge. See, e.g., Acosta v. State, 711 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Williams v. State, 707 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Peri v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Fairell v. State, 662 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- A.S. v. State, 677 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)