EARNEST HILLS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Earnest Hills appeals a trial court order approving involuntary psychiatric treatment under Florida law. The appellate court addresses whether the appeal is moot given that the 90-day treatment period had expired, ultimately concluding the appeal is not moot due to collateral legal consequences from lien provisions.
The appeal is not moot despite the expiration of the treatment period because collateral legal consequences arising from section 402.33(8) lien provisions preserve the case for appellate review. The trial court's order was final and appealable because it marked an end to judicial labor on the matters then pending.
[1] An order approving treatment under section 916.107(3), Florida Statutes, is a final order for purposes of appeal, even if the authorized treatment period is limited.
[2] An appeal is not moot when collateral legal consequences, such as those arising from lien provisions, may still result from the trial court's order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it clearly marked an end to judicial labor as to the matters then pending before the trial court”
Establishes that the order was final and appealable despite the temporary 90-day nature of the treatment authorization
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court issued an order approving treatment pursuant to section 916.107(3), Florida Statutes, which authorized treatment for a 90-day period. …
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ON APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PER CURIAM.
Earnest Hills appeals a final order approving treatment pursuant to section 916.107(3), Florida Statutes. By unpublished order, we previously denied appellee’s motion to dismiss, in which it was argued that the trial court’s order was nonfinal and not otherwise appealable since, under section 916.107(3), it was only effective for a period of 90 days, and appellee could once again petition to continue treatment once the term of treatment authorized by the order on appeal expired. We reiterate our conclusion that this potentiality does not render the order at issue nonfinal, since it clearly marked an end to judicial labor as to the matters then pending before the trial court.
However, in the order denying appel-lee’s motion to dismiss, we sum sponte directed appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot in that the term of treatment authorized by the trial court’s order had now, in fact, expired. Having considered appellant’s response, we conclude that in light of collateral legal consequences arising from the lien provisions of section 402.33(8), Florida Statutes, the appeal is not moot, and we therefore discharge the order to show cause. See Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla.1992); see also, Ozbourn v. State, 651 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). We take this opportunity to suggest, however, that motions to expedite appeals such as this would be well-taken, and would be consistent with counsel’s obligation to zealously pursue the interests of her client. As this case illustrates, any substantive relief to which appellant may be entitled with respect to the course of treatment authorized by the trial court’s order has been rendered largely illusory by the passage of time.
JOANOS, WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Moreland v. State, 706 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…ppellant was discharged from the Florida State Hospital after the issuance of the appealed order and was placed in the custody of the Brevard County Sheriffs Department “for return to court,” the issue in this appeal is not moot. See Hills v. State, 699 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (appeal of a final order approving treatment was not moot despite the lapse of the 90-day effective period of the order, in light of collateral legal consequences arising from the statutory provisions entitling the Department of…
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Simpson v. State, 704 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…erse.1 MINER and WOLF, JJ., and SHIVERS, Senior Judge, concur. . Simpson has already been released from commitment and therefore, the only apparent effect of this decision is to prevent future collateral legal consequences. See Hills v. State, 699 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Ozbourn v. State, 651 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).…
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Godfrey v. State, 220 So. 3d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…tutes (2016), were proved by competent, substantial evidence. We note that order is not moot despite the fact that the 90-day period of treatment mandated by the order has expired. See Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992), and Hills v. State, 699 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). AFFIRMED. ROBERTS, C.J., LEWIS and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.…
Authorities Cited
- Sallas v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992)
- Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992)
- Ozbourn v. State, 651 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)