REPUBLIC FEDERAL BANK, N.A., PETITIONER,
v.
JOSEPH M. DOYLE AND BLANCA ALICIA DOYLE, RESPONDENTS
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The court held that a trial judge's discretion to grant continuances does not permit orders based on benevolence or compassion, as such grounds are not lawful bases for relief.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it grants a continuance of a foreclosure sale based on benevolence and compassion rather than a lawful, cognizable basis.
[2] Judicial discretion must be exercised in accordance with consecrated principles, tradition, analogy, and system, not based on whim, caprice, or spasmodic sentiment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a final judgment of foreclosure, the trial court granted a continuance of the sale date, citing a desire to prevent the defendants from losi…
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We treat the petition for writ of mandamus as one for certiorari and deny the petition.
Following a November 4, 2008 final judgment of foreclosure, and after several delays — caused in part by the filing and the dismissal of a frivolous bankruptcy petition on the eve of a previous sale and a foul-up or two in the clerk’s office — the trial court on July 29, 2009, entered an order fixing August 27, 2009, as the date of the sale. On motion of the defendants, however, apparently on the basis that in the case, like this one, of the foreclosure of a residence she routinely grants continuances of the sale rather than see “anybody lose their house,” the trial judge granted a continuance until October 1, 2009.1 The mortgagee now challenges this ruling. We deny its petition.
Although granting continuances and postponements are, generally speaking, within the discretion of the trial court, the “ground” of benevolence and compassion 2 (or the claim asserted below that the defendants might be able to arrange for payment of the debt during the extended period until the sale) does not constitute a lawful, cognizable basis for granting relief to one side to the detriment of the other, and thus cannot support the order below: no judicial action of any kind can rest on such a foundation. This is particularly true here because the order contravenes the terms of the statute that a sale is to be conducted “not less than 20 days or more than 35 days after the date” of the order or judgment. § 45.031(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). See also Kosoy Kendall Assocs., LLC v. Los Latinos Restaurant, Inc., 10 So.3d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Comcoa, Inc. v. Coe, 587 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
The continuance thus constitutes an abuse of discretion in the most basic sense of that term. As the Court stated in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980):
The trial courts’ discretionary power was never intended to be exercised in accordance with whim or caprice of the judge nor in an inconsistent manner. Judges dealing with cases essentially alike should reach the same result. Different results reached from substantially the same facts comport with neither logic nor reasonableness. In this regard, we note the cautionary words of Justice Cardozo concerning the discretionary power of judges:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevo*1055lence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to “the primordial necessity of order in the social life.” Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921).
See Storm v. Allied Universal Corp., 842 So.2d 245, 246 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (trial judge refused to preclude plaintiff, who misled and deceived the defendants, the jury and the trial court, from further litigation “to give the Plaintiff the break of his life”); Arango v. Arango, 450 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (trial judge reduced attorney’s fee award to spouse of attorney on ground of “professional courtesy”). See also Flagler v. Flagler, 94 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla.1957) (“[Cjourts of equity have [no] right or power under the law of Florida to issue such order it considers to be in the best interest of ‘social justice’ at the particular moment without regard to established law.”); Nordberg v. Green, 638 So.2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (trial court may not decline to follow controlling law on ground it considers its application “inequitable” in particular case), review denied, 649 So.2d 233 (Fla.1994).
Although we thus thoroughly disapprove of the order, in view of the fact that the postponed sale is due to take place within a short time of this decision, no useful purpose will be served by formally quashing the order or ordering the sale to take place on an earlier date with all the procedural complications which would then result. For that reason alone, relief will be denied. We do emphasize that there are to be no further postponements of the sale.
Petition denied.
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Paul v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 68 So. 3d 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…Found., Inc., 403 So. 2d 446, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (“[Cjourts may not withhold entry of a foreclosure judgment merely because of adverse economic conditions and the resultant misfortunes of the mortgagor.”); and Republic Fed. Bank, N.A. v. Doyle, 19 So. 3d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding trial court abused its discretion in granting continuance of foreclosure sale date on ground of benevolence and compassion). After hearing arguments, the trial court ruled that it would not set aside the judgment be…
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Phoenix Holding, LLC v. Martinez, 27 So. 3d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…ion ... constitute^] a lawful, cognizable basis for granting relief to one side to the detriment of the other, and thus cannot support the order below: no judicial action of any kind can rest on such a foundation.” Republic Fed. Bank, N.A. v. Doyle, 19 So. 3d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Although the trial judge might believe otherwise, “[w]e cannot agree that courts of equity have any right or power under the law of Florida to issue such order it considers to be in the best interest of ‘social justice’ at…
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SR Acquisitions-Florida City, LLC v. SAN Remo Homes AT Fla. City, LLC, 78 So. 3d 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…accord Flagship Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Testa,, 429 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (granting mandamus to require the trial judge to enter judgment after a non-jury trial to which the parties had agreed); see also Republic Fed. Bank, N.A. v. Doyle, 19 So. 3d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, only parties or their representatives have standing to seek relief from judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (providing that the court may relieve “a party, or a party’s legal…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Flagler v. Flagler, 94 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1957)
- Comcoa, Inc. v. The Honorable Jack M. COE, 587 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Kosoy Kendall Assocs., LLC v. LOS Latinos Rest. Inc., 10 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
- Nordberg v. Green, 638 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Cooper v. Brickell Bayview Real Est., Inc., 711 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Arango v. Franz Alexander Arango, 450 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Randall v. State, 842 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Storm v. Allied Universal Corp., 842 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)