KAREN COSTA, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1998-06-17
No. 98-0761
STONE, C.J., and STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur.
712 So. 2d 455 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

This case concerns whether a trial court can deny a public defender's motion to withdraw when the public defender certifies an irreconcilable conflict of interest. The appellate court found that the trial court erred in denying the motion, as the public defender should be allowed to withdraw upon certifying a conflict.


Holding

No, a trial court cannot deny a public defender's motion to withdraw when the public defender certifies an irreconcilable conflict of interest. The trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conflict exists.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must allow the public defender's office to withdraw upon certification of a conflict of interest.

[2] A trial court cannot reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conflict exists.

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Key Quotes

“The public defender’s office should be allowed to withdraw upon certifying conflict.”

Establishes the general rule regarding withdrawal of public defenders upon certification of conflict.

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Facts & Procedural History

The petitioner was charged with concealing a child. The child's father, the complaining witness, was previously represented by the same public defende…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, charged with concealing a child contrary to court order, is represented by the public defender’s office. The child’s father is the complaining party and is listed as a State witness. The father was previously represented by the public defender’s office on five separate substance abuse charges. Prior to the filing of any motion to withdraw, the attorneys and the trial court discussed the public defender’s possible conflict arising from this situation.

The trial court found that there was no conflict because the father’s substance abuse was not a defense to the instant charge. On motion of the State, the trial court agreed to exclude evidence of the substance abuse. The assistant public defender filed a motion to withdraw, certifying that an irreconcilable conflict existed between petitioner and the father based on confidential communications received from him regarding his substance abuse problems and his treatment of the child. The State agreed that a conflict necessitating withdrawal existed, but the trial court denied the motion. This petition for writ of certiorari followed.

We find that the trial court’s order causes petitioner irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on final appeal, and constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law. See Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire, 670 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

The public defender’s office should be allowed to withdraw upon certifying conflict. See Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994)(citing Babb v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 859 (Fla.1982)). “[A] trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conflict exists.” Guzman, 644 So. 2d at 999; Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

Nor does the weighing of the facts which occurred prior to the filing of the public defender’s motion in this case allow for a denial of the motion.

We grant the petition, quash the order denying the public defender’s motion to withdraw, and remand for entry of an order granting said motion.

STONE, C.J., and STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Reardon v. State, 715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …sands. While the trial court’s concerns are understandable, we have no choice but to grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order, as it is clear under Guzman that the trial court has no discretion in this matter. See, e.g., Costa v. State, 712 So. 2d 455, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1472 (Fla. 4th DCA June 17, 1998) (public defender’s office should be allowed to withdraw upon certifying conflict); Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Following the dictates of Guzman, once the public defen…
  • Leslie v. State, 720 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …t gave rise to the public defender’s determination that a conflict existed. See § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1997); Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla.1994); Reardon v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1881, 715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Costa v. State, 712 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Cankur v. State, 706 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Banks v. State, 661 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Crowe v. State, 701 So. 2d 431, 431-32 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (Dauksch, J., concurring specially). Therefore, we grant the pet…

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