DAVID FROME GREENBERG, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A 900 I.N. DIRECT, INC. APPELLANT,
v.
HALL, DICKLER, KENT, FRIEDMAN, AND WOOD, L.L.P., APPELLEE
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A law firm sued a corporate director individually for unpaid legal bills allegedly rendered to his dissolved corporation. The Florida appellate court reversed summary judgment, finding genuine factual disputes regarding whether the legal services were actually requested and whether the invoices were accurate, and whether the corporation was administratively dissolved.
Summary judgment was improvidently entered because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the legal services were requested, whether the invoices were accurate, and whether the corporate entity was administratively dissolved. The moving party failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the non-existence of material issues of fact, and therefore the burden never shifted to the appellants to provide opposing evidence.
[1] Summary judgment is improvidently entered when genuine factual disputes exist regarding whether legal services were rendered at the request of the appellants and whether…
[2] A genuine issue of material fact regarding the administrative dissolution of a corporate entity precludes summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where there exist issues of material fact, summary judgment cannot be granted.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that summary judgment is improper when material factual disputes exist.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHall, Dickler, Kent, Friedman, and Wood, L.L.P. sued David Frome Greenberg individually and 900 I.N. Direct, Inc. for unpaid legal bills in a three-co…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the entry of a final summary judgment. The appellee law firm sued appellants, David Frome Greenberg individually and 900 I.N. Direct, Inc. (“Direct”) for unpaid legal bills in a three-count complaint for open account, account stated, and services rendered to Direct. The firm sought to impose individual liability against Greenberg pursuant to section 607.1421(4), Florida Statutes (1997) 1 because Greenberg allegedly was a director of Direct who continued to conduct business and incur the legal bills at issue on behalf of Direct after this corporation had been administratively dissolved. Final summary judgment was entered by the lower court on all of the firm’s causes of action and this appeal followed.
Based upon our careful and thorough review of the record evidence before us, we conclude that summary judgment was improvidently entered in this cause where there is a genuine factual dispute both as to whether the firm’s legal services were in fact rendered to appellants at their request and whether the invoices being sued upon were accurate even if such services were requested. Where there exist issues of material fact, summary judgment cannot be granted. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla.1966); Valk v. J.E.M. Distribs. of Tampa Bay, Inc., 700 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Pic-Morris, Inc. v. Isfan, 683 So. 2d 676, 676-77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Rocking Chair Motel, Inc. v. FDIC, 529 So. 2d 1277, 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
Moreover, the entry of summary judgment against Green-berg in his individual capacity pursuant to section 607.1421 was also error where the parties’ pleadings created an issue of fact as to whether the appellant corporate entity was in fact administratively dissolved as alleged and the appellee firm thereafter came forth with no proof of this entity’s alleged dissolution as part of its motion for summary judgment.
Thus, as here, where the moving party for summary judgment failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the non-existence of material issues of fact by competent evidence on this issue, the burden never shifted to the appellants to come forward with evidence in opposition to the motion and the motion should have been denied. See Carbonell v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 675 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Knight v. Roberts RV Resort, 671 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Knight Energy Servs., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 660 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Star Lakes Estates Ass’n, Inc. v. Auerbach, 656 So. 2d 271, 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Zoda v. Hedden, 596 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
. The pertinent part of the statute states:
A director, officer, or agent of a corporation dissolved pursuant to this section, purporting to act on behalf of the corporation, is personally liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation arising from such action and incurred subsequent to the corporation’s administrative dissolution only if he or she has actual notice of the administrative dissolution at the time such action is taken[.]
§ 607.1421(4), Fla. Stat. (1997).
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Buzzi v. Quality Serv. Station, Inc., 921 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…for summary judgment state conclusions, they do not suggest the absence of an issue of material fact; thus the burden is not shifted to the nonmovant to present evidence to the contrary. Greenberg v. Hall, Dickler, Kent, Friedman, and Wood, L.L.P., 718 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). If general conclusions such as that the car wash was in violation of Motiva rules and regulations, like those in the letters and the Santos affidavit, would suffice to shift the burden to the nonmovant, Buzzi’s statements i…
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Albo v. Riverside Christian Ministries, Inc., 737 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ecord reflects that there remain genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by the fact-finder. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985); Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966); Greenberg v. Hall, Dickler, Kent, Friedman & Wood, L.L.P., 718 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Knight Energy Servs., Inc. v. Amoco OIL Co., 660 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Carbonell v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 675 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Zoda v. Hedden, 596 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Star Lakes Ests. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dory Auerbach and Hortense Auerbach, 656 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Inversiones Armadeni, S.A. v. Tejedo, 700 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Valk v. J.E.M. Distribs. OF Tampa BAY, Inc., 700 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Knight v. Roberts RV Resort, 671 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Rocking Chair Motel, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 529 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Gonzalez v. State, 683 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)