STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
EDDIE J. GALLOWAY, RESPONDENT
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The court held that a trial court has the power to impose sexual predator status post-sentencing.
The State appealed an order denying its motion for written finding of sexual predator status. The respondent had pled nolo contendere to sexual batter…
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PER CURIAM.
The State appealed an order denying its Motion for Written Finding of Sexual Predator Status, from the Circuit Court of Escam-bia County, Kenneth L. Williams, Judge. We treat the appeal as a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and grant the petition.1
Respondent, Eddie J. Galloway, pled nolo contendere on February 25, 1997, to two counts of sexual battery on a child under 12 years of age, a capital felony. Both offenses occurred prior to October 1, 1996.
On June 11,1997, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to declare respondent a sexual predator and denied the motion in the belief that sexual predator status could not be imposed after sentencing.
However, respondent’s crimes qualified him for sexual predator status under former section 775.2S(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), and a trial court does have the power to impose sexual predator status post-sentencing under sections 775.21(4)(a)(2) and 775.21(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (1997). See Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), review denied, 707 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1998); State v. Carrasco, 701 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Downs v. State, 700 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Accordingly, we grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, quash the order below, and remand for further proceedings.
MINER and LAWRENCE, JJ., and McDonald, PARKER LEE, Senior Judge, concur. . While a defendant, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(C), may appeal an order that imposes sexual predator status, there is no corollary for the State. See Downs v. State, 700 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Curtin, 764 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…URIAM. In the instant case, the state petitions for writ of certiorari and argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it denied the state’s motion to declare respondent a sexual predator. See State v. Galloway, 721 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that state appeal from an order denying a motion for written finding of sexual predator status should be made pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari). Respondent entered a plea of guilty1 to the first degree felo…
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State v. Ellis D. Colley, 744 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…l an order declining to impose a sexual predator designation. The First District has addressed this jurisdictional question and has decided that the State must file a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge such an order. See State v. Galloway, 721 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). On the other hand, a sexual predator designation is not a sentence or punishment, but is a regulatory act done for remedial purposes. See Collie, 710 So. 2d 1000. In general, the rules of criminal procedure do not apply to sexu…
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Moore v. State, 880 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…te, 699 So. 2d 346, 346-47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (holding designation of sexual predators more than 60 days after imposition of sentences was not an impermissible modification of their sentences in violation of Rule 3.800); see also State v. Galloway, 721 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“[A] trial court [has] the power to impose sexual predator status post-sentencing under [the Act].”); Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d [*829] 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (upholding trial court’s grant of State’s motion to decl…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Downs v. State, 700 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Blase v. Blase, 701 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)