STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JACKIE RAY MAPLES, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a 30-year sentence imposed on Jackie Ray Maples for burglary with assault or battery committed shortly after his release from prison. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act mandated the maximum statutory penalty (life imprisonment) rather than the 30-year sentence imposed.
The sentence was incompatible with the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. The trial court was required to impose the maximum statutory penalty allowable for the offense (life imprisonment), not a lesser 30-year sentence, when a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee re-offender.
[1] The term "felony punishable by life" in the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act includes both life felonies and first-degree felonies punishable by a term of years not exceedi…
[2] A conviction for armed robbery with a firearm, which is a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life, qualifies for a mandatory…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Legislature finds the best deterrent to prevent prison releasees from committing future crimes is to require that any releasee who commits new serious felonies [within three years of being released from prison] be sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration allowed by law”
Establishes the legislative intent and purpose of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaples was released from prison on August 29, 1997, and committed the current offense (burglary with an assault or battery) less than two months later…
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PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida appeals the 30 year sentence imposed upon Jackie Ray Maples for, among other crimes, burglary with an assault or battery. § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Maples had been released from prison for prior crimes on August 29, 1997, when he committed the current offense less than two months after his release. The trial court found that Maples qualified as a prison releasee re-offender and sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment. § 775.082(8)(a)2 b, Fla. Stat. (1997). We find the sentence to be incompatible with the legislative directives of the Prison Re-leasee Reoffender Act (Act).
The Act’s preamble states in pertinent part that, “the Legislature finds the best deterrent to prevent prison releasees from committing future crimes is to require that any releasee who commits new serious felonies [within three years of being released from prison] be sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration allowed by law....” Ch. 97-239, Preamble, at 2795-96, Laws of Fla. The penalty prescribed for burglary is a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment, and in order to comply with the Act, the trial court was required to impose the most severe penalty allowable, to wit: life imprisonment. §§ 810.02(2), 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Fla. Stat. (1997). See also Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (legislative history of Act states in pertinent part that, “If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant qualifies [under the Act], it has no discretion and must impose the statutory maximum allowable for the offense”); McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (summarizing the sentencing scheme of the Act, the court concluded that essentially, the mandatory minimum under the Act is the maximum statutory penalty); Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (the Act provides for greater penalties for certain offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility) (emphasis added), rev. denied, 727 So. 2d 909 (Fla.1999); Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (Act’s purpose was to impose stricter punishment on re-offenders to protect society) (emphasis added), rev. denied, 727 So. 2d 915 (Fla.1999).
SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.
HARRIS, PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Newmones, 765 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…tate’s objections, the trial court sentenced Newmones to 30 years in prison. This court has held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act mandates a penalty of life in prison for burglary because it is a felony “punishable by life.” State v. Maples, 739 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA), cause dismissed, Case No. 96,677, — So. 2d - (Fla.1999). See also Knight v. State, 2000 WL 305324, — So. 2d - (Fla. 1st DCA Mar.27, 2000); Brown v. State, 1999 WL 1112715,-So. 2d - (Fla. 1st DCA Dec.8, 1999). The trial judge has no d…
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Maples v. State, 804 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…did not make him feel inebriated, but in fact helped him understand the proceedings. AFFIRMED. HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . §§ 810.02(1) and (2)(A); 784.03, Fla. Stat. . § 856.021, Fla. Stat. .§ 843.02, Fla. Stat. . See State v. Maples, 739 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), rev. denied, 770 So. 2d 159 (Fla.2000).…
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Ronnye Eugene Sullivan v. State, 760 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…appellant’s thirty year sentence imposed for the offense of robbery with a firearm, a first degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding life, should have been enhanced under the PRRA to a life sentence. The decision in State v. Maples, 739 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) requires enhancement and the cause is remanded for imposition of a life sentence. SENTENCE VACATED IN PART; REMANDED. COBB, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Barfield v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Young v. State, 719 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)