JOE LEWIS JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jenkins challenges the summary denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction motion seeking jail credit for 11 days spent in county jail from April 1-12, 1993, prior to his violation of probation sentencing. The appellate court reversed, holding that a defendant may file successive postconviction motions claiming additional sentence credit for different time periods, and remanded for the trial court to either provide conclusive evidence of ineligibility or hold further proceedings.
The court held that a defendant is entitled to jail credit for all time spent in county jail prior to sentencing in a violation case, and that while a defendant cannot raise the same illegal sentencing issue in successive motions, a defendant may file a timely Rule 3.850 motion claiming additional credit for a different time period after a prior Rule 3.800(a) motion was denied. The trial court erred in summarily denying the motion without establishing that the current claim involved the same time period as the prior motion.
[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent in county jail prior to sentencing in a violation of probation case, including time spent prior to the original sente…
[2] A claim for jail credit for a specific period of time is not necessarily successive or an abuse of process simply because a prior motion sought jail credit for a differen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant is entitled to an award of credit for all time spent in the county jail prior to sentencing in a violation case, which includes all time spent in the county jail prior to the original sentencing plus all time spent in the county jail prior to any subsequent violation sentencings.”
Establishes the fundamental entitlement to jail credit for all presentencing county jail time in violation cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenkins is serving two sentences for violation of probation. He spent 11 days in county jail from April 1-12, 1993, awaiting a June 1993 violation of …
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WOLF, J.
Appellant challenges the summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. He raises two issues on appeal, only one of which has merit: Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying appellant’s claim for jail credit for presen-tencing time spent in the county jail from April 1,1993, to April 12, 1993.
Appellant is currently serving two sentences imposed for a violation of probation. A defendant is entitled to an award of credit for all time spent in the county jail prior to sentencing in a violation case, which includes all time spent in the county jail prior to the original sentencing plus all time spent in the county jail prior to any subsequent violation sentencings. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 543 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The allegations contained in appellant’s motion indicate that he spent 11 days in the county jail from April 1, 1993, through April 12, 1993, awaiting a June 1993 violation of community control (VOCC) sentencing in this case. If this is true, appellant is entitled to credit against his violation of probation (VOP) sentences for this time unless the award of 167 days credit against his VOP sentences for pre-sentencing county jail time served already includes credit for this time (which cannot be determined from this record).
The trial court denied appellant’s claim for the 11 days’ jail credit on grounds that the claim was improperly successive and constituted an abuse of process. In support of this conclusion, the trial court attached to the order denying relief copies of a prior rule 3.800(a) motion for jail credit and the trial court’s order denying that prior motion on the merits. These record excerpts do not, however, conclusively demonstrate that appellant’s current claim for jail credit was improperly successive or an abuse of process. The rule 3.800(a) motion sought credit for time spent in the county jail from August 9, 1996, through March 19, 1997, which is a different period of time from that for which credit was sought in the rule 3.850 motion in this case — April 1, 1993, through April 12, 1993. While a defendant may not raise the same illegal sentencing issue in successive postconviction motions, see, e.g., Smith v. State, 685 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), we have found no authority which prohibits a defendant from filing a timely rule 3.850 motion claiming an entitlement to additional sentence credit subsequent to a denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion claiming sentence credit for a different time period. While allowing a defendant to file successive postconviction motions claiming additional credit for different time periods is not the best or most efficient use of judicial resources, in light of the fact that a denial of credit results in an illegal sentence, there appears to be no prohibition against this practice. We, therefore, reverse in part and remand for the trial court either to attach those portions of the record which conclusively demonstrate that appellant is not entitled to the claimed credit or to hold further proceedings on this matter. BARFIELD, C.J., and ERVIN, J., concur.
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State v. Antoine L. McBRIDE, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003)…e under rule 3.800, the lower court denies relief and the defendant fails to appeal, he may not later raise the same issue in another rule 3.800 motion.” Id. Accord Tis-dol v. State, 823 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); see also Jenkins v. State, 749 So. 2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (noting that a defendant may not raise the same illegal sentencing issue in successive post-conviction motions); Price v. State, 692 So. 2d 971, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that rule 3.800 “contains no proscription agains…
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McCool v. State, 211 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…nt in the county jail prior to sentencing in a violation case, which includes all time spent in the county jail prior to the original sentencing plus all time spent in the county jail prior to any subsequent violation sentencings.” Jenkins v. State, 749 So. 2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see also Nicholson v. State, 141 So. 3d 757, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that the appellant was entitled to the 61 days of jail credit previously awarded as a time served sentence as well as any additional time served…
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Williamson v. State, 765 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…not clear from the record for which time periods he was reevaluated. This court has held a defendant is not prohibited from filing separate motions claiming an entitlement to jail credit for different specific periods of time. See Jenkins v. State, 749 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). A jail credit error may be corrected pursuant to rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850. See State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 431-432 (Fla.1998). Therefore, the trial court’s order is reversed and the cause is remanded for an evidentiary…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cleon L. Smith v. State, 685 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Hammer v. State, 543 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)