MICHAEL WILLIAMSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Michael Williamson appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief challenging whether he received all jail credit to which he was entitled. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that Williamson stated a prima facie case of an illegal sentence that must be addressed on the merits, even though his pleading was technically defective as an ineffective assistance claim.
Although Williamson's motion was technically defective as an ineffective assistance claim, it stated a prima facie case of an illegal sentence. A jail credit error may be corrected under rule 3.850, and the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach documentation that conclusively refutes the defendant's claim of entitlement to additional credit.
[1] A motion alleging entitlement to additional jail credit, even if framed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, must be addressed on the merits as a claim for an i…
[2] A defendant is not entitled to jail credit for time spent on house arrest or in a drug rehabilitation program.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although Williamson drafted his motion in the form of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to ensure he received the proper jail credit, his motion sets forth a prima facie case of an illegal sentence which must be either corrected or refuted.”
Establishes that despite defective pleading, the court will address the underlying substance of the claim as an illegal sentence issue.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliamson was sentenced in 1998 pursuant to a plea agreement to 41 months incarceration for burglary and grand theft, with 380 days credit for time s…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jail Credit cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Michael Williamson appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse the denial and remand for a determination on the merits.
Williamson was sentenced in 1998 pursuant to a plea agreement to 41 months incarceration for the offenses of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft, with 380 days credit for time served. In his rule 3.850 motion, Williamson alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure he received the proper jail credit. Williamson sets out several specific periods of time for which he alleges he was entitled to jail credit that he did not receive. The trial court denied Williamson’s claim on the basis that his claim was improperly pleaded and not subject to a rule 3.850 challenge. The trial court also ruled that appellant had been awarded all jail credit to which he was entitled, but did not attach any supporting documentation.
Although Williamson drafted his motion in the form of an ineffective assis tance of counsel claim for failure to ensure he received the proper jail credit,1 his motion sets forth a prima facie case of an illegal sentence which must be either corrected or refuted. Williamson was correctly denied jail credit, for the majority of the time he sets forth in his motion. He is not entitled to credit for time spent on house arrest nor in a drug rehabilitation program. See, e.g., Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla.1981); Shmuel v. State, 691 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Nevertheless, we are unable to determine from the record before us whether, as Williamson maintains, he may be entitled to additional credit for time spent awaiting sentencing after being arrested for violation of probation. Further, although Williamson has previously been awarded additional jail credit, it is not clear from the record for which time periods he was reevaluated. This court has held a defendant is not prohibited from filing separate motions claiming an entitlement to jail credit for different specific periods of time. See Jenkins v. State, 749 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
A jail credit error may be corrected pursuant to rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850. See State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429, 431-432 (Fla.1998). Therefore, the trial court’s order is reversed and the cause is remanded for an evidentiary hearing or attachment of documentation from the record which conclusively refutes Williamson’s claim that he is entitled to additional jail credit.
ERVIN, VAN NORTWICK AND BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR. . As a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Williamson's motion is defective. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Williamson must allege that specific acts or omissions of counsel constituted a deficient performance and that, but for such deficient perfor-manee, the outcome of the case would have been different. Williamson fails to allege specifically how counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficiency resulted in the trial court's failure to award him the jail credit to which he claims he is entitled.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hamilton v. State, 898 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…or in state prison. Young v. State, 754 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The first district has followed Pennington and refused to allow credit for time spent in drug' rehab. Calhoun v. State, 403 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Williamson v. State, 765 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The third district has held this consistently. Smith v. State, 619 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The fifth district also appears to have correctly applied the supreme court’s…
-
Antowayne D. Hill v. State, 813 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…spent in a residential drug treatment program as a condition of probation. We disagree. A defendant is not entitled to credit for time served in a drug treatment program. See Aviles v. State, 794 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Williamson v. State, 765 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). AFFIRMED. SHARP, W. and PALMER, JJ„ concur.…
-
Aviles v. State, 794 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…3.800(a) motion, he claims that he is entitled to credit for time served in a drug treatment center. He also claims there were errors on his guideline scoresheet. The trial court correctly denied the claim for credit, relying on Williamson v. State, 765 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), in which the court held that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served in a drug treatment program. See also Taylor v. State, 726 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The trial court also correctly denied the scoresheet er…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998)
- Doretha Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1981)
- Jenkins v. State, 749 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Maxim Ben Shmuel v. State, 691 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)