STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DWAYNE JONES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Second District Court of Appeal's decision invalidating a violent career criminal sentencing statute (chapter 95-182) as violating the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution, and remanded for resentencing under the valid laws in effect when the defendant committed the offenses.
Chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule. Jones' violent career criminal sentence is reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect on October 2, 1995, the date Jones committed the underlying offenses.
[1] Chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule.
[2] A defendant may raise a single subject rule challenge to a statute even if the statutory window for such challenges has closed.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Based on our decision in State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla.1999), in which we held unconstitutional chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, as violative of the single subject rule, we affirm the decision below reversing Jones' violent career criminal sentence and remand this cause for resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect on October 2, 1995, the date on which Jones committed the underlying offenses in this case.”
Establishes the Court's holding that chapter 95-182 is unconstitutional and that resentencing must use laws valid at the time of the offense.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDwayne Jones was sentenced as a violent career criminal to life in prison on an armed robbery count and forty years with a thirty-year minimum mandato…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Article Iii, Section 6 Of The Florida Constitution cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), in which the Second District Court of Appeal followed its prior decision in Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), in holding that chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1) Fla. Const.1 Based on our decision in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1999), in which we held unconstitutional chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, as violative of the single subject rule, we affirm the decision below revers ing Jones’ violent career criminal sentence2 and remand this cause for resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect on October 2, 1995, the date on which Jones committed the underlying offenses in this case.3 See Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643, 644 (remanding for resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect at the time the defendant committed her offenses).
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents.
. We also note that the Jones Court's holding expressly and directly conflicts with the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Higgs v. State, 695 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
. The trial court’s oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing clearly shows that Jones was sentenced as a violent career criminal:
On the armed robbery count, you will be adjudicated, you’ll be sentenced as a violent career criminal to life in prison on the armed robbery.... As to the aggravated battery charge, you'll be adjudicated, sentenced to forty years in Florida State Prison with a minimum mandatory of thirty years.
Record on Appeal at 390-91; accord § 775.084(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995) (setting forth permitted sentences for those qualifying as violent career criminals). However, the written sentencing order entered by the trial court indicates that Jones was sentenced on both offenses as a habitual violent felony offender under section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. See Record on Appeal at 69-76. The written sentencing order is inconsistent with the oral sentencing pronouncement; in such a situation, the oral pronouncement controls. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla.1998) (citing Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996), for the proposition that "there is a judicial policy that the actual oral imposition of sanctions should prevail over any subsequent written order to the contrary”); Driver v. State, 710 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that ”[w]hen a written order does not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls”).
. We note that Jones has standing to raise a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, even assuming the window period for raising such a challenge closed on October 1, 1996, as determined by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826, 826 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 749 So. 2d 503 (Fla.1999). Further, we quash that portion of the decision below that remanded this cause for resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect at the time that Jones was sentenced.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)…g and with our earlier precedent. Additionally, the First District’s decision in this case conflicts with a longstanding principle of law — that a court’s oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the written document. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 753 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla.2000); State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1998); Justice, 674 So. 2d at 126; Driver v. State, 710 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Generally, the oral pronouncement prevails unless the oral pronouncement is in error due to a cleric…
-
Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007)…a written sentence that conflicts with the oral pronouncement of sentence imposed in open court is an illegal sentence. Indeed, we have restricted the authority of a trial court to enter a conflicting written sentence in this manner. State v. Jones, 753 So. 2d 1276, 1277 n. 2 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, no court has the authority to enter such a sentence, since the oral pronouncement controls and constitutes the legal sentence imposed. For this reason, we agree with the decisions of the First, Second, Third, and…
-
Karlier Robinson v. State, 850 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…ence of community control, because the statutory maximum for the appellant’s underlying offense was five years). Moreover, because the written sentence is inconsistent with the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. See State v. Jones, 753 So. 2d 1276, 1276 n. 2 (Fla.2000); Timmons v. State, 453 So. 2d 143, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Although the trial court attempted to correct its sentencing errors in its July 22, 2002, order,2 because the trial court entered its order in response to appellant’s…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)
- Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)
- Caison v. State, 695 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- State v. Chuck Junior Williams, 712 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1998)
- Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Vining v. Segal, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Driver v. State, 710 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Iva Polak Wummer v. Blanton, 709 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Thompson v. State, 709 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)