KENYA RENARD COPELAND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2000-04-05
No. 2D98-4403
GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur.
756 So. 2d 180 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2000) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

Kenya Renard Copeland appeals his cocaine possession conviction after officers conducted a pat-down search following a traffic stop. The appellate court affirms, finding the stop and search justified under the principles established in Illinois v. Wardlow, where unusual and suspicious behavior in a high-crime area provides reasonable suspicion for a stop.


Holding

The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Copeland's unusual and suspicious behavior—backing away nervously, positioning himself behind a woman, and concealing his hands—provided reasonable suspicion to justify both the stop and the pat-down search under the principles of Illinois v. Wardlow.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer may conduct a pat-down search for weapons if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.

[2] A person's presence in a high-crime area, combined with evasive or suspicious behavior such as concealing hands behind the back and positioning another person as a shield…

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Key Quotes

“Prior to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, we would have found that the stop violated Mr. Copeland's Fourth Amendment rights.”

Establishes that Wardlow changed the legal landscape regarding stops based on suspicious behavior in high-crime areas

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Facts & Procedural History

On September 18, 1997, Lakeland police officers patrolling a high-crime area in an unmarked car observed a maroon Mustang with a group of people clust…

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Opinion of the Court
ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.

ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.

Kenya Renard Copeland appeals his judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine following the denial of his dispositive motions to suppress evidence. Because the circumstances surrounding the stop and pat-down search in this case are almost indistinguishable from those presented in the recent United States Supreme Court’s decision of Illinois v. Wardlow, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), we affirm.

On September 18, 1997, Lakeland police officers who were members of a drug task force set out in the late evening hours to patrol an area on North Ohio Street. Within the preceding week, the officers had received a tip that drug activity had increased in this vicinity, an area the officers described as a “high crime area.” The three officers on patrol were in an unmarked patrol car and wore black fatigue uniforms, a badge, a gun belt, and a hat labeled “police.” Around midnight, as the officers’ car turned the corner onto Ohio Street, they saw a maroon Mustang automobile parked in front of a residence with a group of five or six people clustered around the driver’s door. When they approached the vehicle, two or three people looked up and immediately fled the area. Mr. Copeland did not run, but instead began backing away from the officers, looking nervous. He positioned himself so that he was standing behind a woman, thus placing the woman between himself and the officers. Mr. Copeland also concealed his hands behind his back, leading at least one officer to be concerned that he might have a weapon.

Two of the officers immediately noticed Mr. Copeland’s behavior and directed their attention toward him. One officer moved behind Mr. Copeland and held him in an “arm bar” while a second officer came up and conducted a pat-down search. During the pat-down, the officer felt what he believed from his experience to be cocaine. The officer thereafter removed a small plastic bag of cocaine from Mr. Copeland’s pocket.

At the hearing on Mr. Copeland’s motion to suppress, the State argued that Mr. Copeland’s elusive behavior gave the officers both a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop and a reasonable suspicion that he was armed to justify the pat-down. Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, we would have found that the stop violated Mr. Copeland’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Stiffler v. State, 744 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); M.J.S. v. State, 624 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Hewlett v. State, 599 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In Wardlow, however, the Supreme Court held that a stop under similar circumstances did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In that case, the defendant engaged in “headlong flight” when the officers approached. See Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 675. In this case, some of the participants engaged in similar flight. Mr. Copeland’s conduct was not flight, but it was equally unusual, suspicious behavior. We can see no relevant distinction between the facts in Wardlow and the facts in this case.

Affirmed.

GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • McMASTER v. State, 780 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …8); Gandy; Warren. Thus Ward-low, a decision that is binding on this court, has effectively overruled Pritchett, Gipson, Bastien and other Florida cases with similar holdings. See State v. O.S., 767 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Copeland v. State, 756 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). [*1030] In Wardlow, the Court held that although presence in a high crime area is not sufficient to justify a stop of an individual, it is a factor that may be considered along with other factors in determining whether a reasonab…
  • State v. Gandy, 766 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
    …ave outlinecl above, such flight is not the sole basis for the officers’ reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory detention in this case. It is, however, a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances. See Copeland v. State, 756 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). For the reasons discussed in the foregoing opinion, we reverse the trial court’s order granting appellee Gandy’s motion to [*1238] suppress and remand for further proceedings. BARFIELD, C.J., MINER and PADOVANO, JJ„ CONCUR.…
  • Walker v. State, 846 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …. The arrest affidavit indicates that Walker was arrested at 7:39 p.m. in July 2000. The totality of the circumstances does not support a finding of reasonable suspicion in the present case. Further, this is not a situation as in Copeland v. State, 756 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), where Walker or Mr. Butler attempted to elude the police officer or acted nervous or suspicious upon being approached. Walker and Mr. Butler did not attempt to leave the area, and the officer described Walker as “very cooperative…

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