M.J.S., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant, making the subsequent search and seizure illegal.
[1] A law enforcement officer's observation of an individual leaning into a car window in a high-crime area, without more, does not establish reasonable suspicion to justify…
[2] A frisk for weapons is permissible when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA deputy observed the appellant leaning into a car in a high drug area and then frisked him, finding cocaine in his hat. The deputy did not witness a …
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PATTERSON, Judge.
In this juvenile proceeding, the appellant challenges the order placing him on community control. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress since the evidence was found as a result of an illegal search and seizure. We agree and reverse.
Larry Carr, a deputy with the Polk County Sheriffs Office, testified at the hearing that on November 25, 1991, he was driving through an apartment complex in a high drug area and saw the appellant and two other individuals standing in the street listening to music around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. The deputy saw a car approach the appellant and flip its headlights on and off. The appellant walked up to the passenger door and leaned inside the car. When the deputy walked towards him, the appellant stood up quickly. The appellant became nervous and tried to leave. The deputy frisked the appellant for weapons and did not feel anything on the appellant’s person. However, when he felt the appellant’s coonskin hat, he felt an object in the fold. The deputy searched the cap and found a baggie containing rock cocaine. The deputy admitted he did not see a crime being committed or an exchange of objects.
The facts do not support a finding that the deputy had a reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the appellant because the deputy did not see money or drugs transferred between the appellant and the occupant of the car. See Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA1992); State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA1992). In a similar case, Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA1990), the First District held that a stop “was not warranted simply based on the officer’s observation of the appellant, in a high-crime district, leaning into the window of a stopped car and his proceeding to walk away rapidly upon seeing the officer approach.” 566 So. 2d at 52.
Therefore, the trial court should have suppressed the evidence found as a result of the illegal search of the appellant’s hat. Accordingly, we reverse the order of community control.
Reversed.
HALL, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…f the individuals involved, and did not see any cash or packaging consistent with a drug transaction. The courts have held that these kinds of observations are insufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion for a stop. See, e.g., M.J.S. v. State, 624 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop juvenile simply based on his observation of the juvenile and two others in a high-drug area in the evening, leaning into the window of a stopped car and attempting to leave upon s…
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Copeland v. State, 756 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…he pat-down. Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, we would have found that the stop violated Mr. Copeland’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Stiffler v. State, 744 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); M.J.S. v. State, 624 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Hewlett v. State, 599 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In Wardlow, however, the Supreme Court held that a stop under similar circumstances did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In…
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Burnett v. State, 644 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…seeing a drag transaction or exchange of cash or packages consistent with drag transactions, are not sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion to support a stop. See State v. Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also M.J.S. v. State, 624 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Absent founded suspicion to support a stop, the search is invalid, and the evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid search must be suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress and re…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- State v. Clark, 605 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Messer v. State, 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- In the Interest of G.F., 609 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)