P.J. AS PARENT OF B.H., J.H., A.H., J.H., AND B.J., CHILDREN, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, APPELLEE
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The Florida appellate court vacated a parental termination order due to procedural defects: the trial court failed to include required findings of fact and improperly cited an unenacted statute. The court remanded for entry of a proper order with adequate factual findings.
The trial court erred by failing to include required findings of fact and by citing an inapplicable, unenacted statute. The order must be vacated and remanded for entry of a proper termination order with adequate factual findings. The trial court did not reversibly err in considering the guardian ad litem's report because the mother's counsel failed to object or request a continuance when advised the guardian ad litem was not present.
[1] Termination of parental rights is supported by competent substantial evidence when the evidence demonstrates that a child's severe injuries were the result of physical ab…
[2] A child's young age, the nature of injuries, expert testimony attributing injuries to a traumatic event, and the parents' lack of a plausible explanation support a findin…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 39.809(5) of the Florida Statutes (1999) requires trial courts to enter written termination orders which set forth findings of facts and conclusions of law.”
Establishes the statutory requirement that the trial court violated by failing to include any factual findings in its termination order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceP.J. (mother) had her parental rights terminated concerning five children. The termination was based on evidence that the mother inflicted severe phys…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PALMER, J.
P.J. (mother) appeals the final order entered by the trial court terminating her parental rights to her five children.
We agree with the mother that the trial court erred in failing to set forth any findings of fact in the termination order and in referencing an incorrect sub-section of the applicable statute.
Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand this matter for entry of a proper order.
Section 39.809(5) of the Florida Statutes (1999) requires trial courts to enter written termination orders which set forth findings of facts and conclusions of law. See § 39.809(5), Fla.Stat. (1999); J.R. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 773 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
The instant termination order fails to contain any factual findings. Rather, the order merely states that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother engaged in egregious conduct toward her three year old son, that it was manifestly in the best interest of all of her children that an order terminating the mother’s parental rights be entered, that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the children from harm, and that reunification with the mother posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the children. Presumably, this ruling was based upon the evidence submitted by DCF demonstrating that the mother inflicted severe physical abuse upon her three year old son; however, the order fails to state as much. As a result, we must vacate the instant termination order and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a termination order which complies with the statute. See I.M. v. Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 668 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); In the Interest of C.K., 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
We further agree with the mother that the instant termination order improperly cites to section 39.806(l)(h) of the Florida Statutes (1999) as a legal basis to support the court’s ruling. Section 39.806(l)(h) was not set forth in any of DCF’s pleadings, was not discussed by the parties during the adjudicatory hearing, and was not yet enacted on the date that the instant termination petition was filed. Thus, on remand, the trial court is directed to disregard that provision of the statute.
Lastly, we reject as meritless the mother’s claim that the trial court reversibly erred in considering the guardian ad litem’s report even though he was not present at the adjudicatory hearing.
The record reveals that, although during the adjudicatory hearing the mother’s attorney indicated to the court that she wanted to examine the guardian ad litem, when the court advised her that he was not present, counsel did not object to the court’s consideration of the GAL report or request a continuance so that the guardian ad litem could appear as a witness. On this record, reversal is not warranted. See K.S. v. R.C., 766 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Sharp, J. concurring) (noting that unless evidentiary objections are made during trial they are waived for purposes of appellate review).
ORDER VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED.
COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
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Johnston v. Hudlett, 32 So. 3d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…he first time on appeal. See, e.g., Tengbergen v. State, 9 So.Sd 729, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that a party’s trial objection was waived by his failure to object when the expert evidence was introduced); P.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 783 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (stating that unless evidentiary objections are made during trial they are waived for purposes of appellate review). No harmful error has occurred. The Johnstons also raise claims that the enforcement of Hudlett’s mortgage…
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P.J. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 821 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…eld a TPR hearing on November 1, 1999, and entered an order terminating the mother’s parental rights to her five children on November 3, 1999. The mother appealed. We issued our opinion on March 30, 2001, P.J. v. Department of Children and Families, 783 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In that opinion, we noted that “reversal was not warranted,” but we remanded the cause for the trial court to “enter a termination order which complies with the statute.” Id. On remand, the trial court entered an amended TPR or…
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J.B.P. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 868 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…that “[t]he judge shall enter a written order with the findings of fact and conclusions of law.” As such, this court could vacate the order and direct the trial court to comply with section 39.809(5). See, e.g., P.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 783 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); J.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Because the complete record is sufficient and enables us to review the final order of termination, even with only a single omnibus finding, we have elec…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- IN the Interest of C.K. v. State, 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- State v. Honorable J. Rogers Padgett, 601 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- I.M. v. State, 668 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- J.R. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 773 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- K.S. v. R.C., 766 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)