A.L., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A.L., a minor, appeals his adjudication of delinquency for battery. The court affirms the adjudication but remands for sentencing correction, finding the sentence imposed an indefinite period of community control without specifying a maximum duration and included a requirement not stated at the oral pronouncement.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal because sufficient evidence of guilt existed. The court held that the indefinite sentence violated Florida law, which requires any commitment period not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the same offense (one year for battery as a first degree misdemeanor). The court held that the letter of apology requirement must be stricken because it was not included in the oral pronouncement.
[1] A motion for judgment of acquittal admits the facts in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the State that may be drawn from the facts.
[2] If there is a conflict in the facts and different conclusions may reasonably be drawn, the conflict should be resolved by the fact finder.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In a motion for judgment of acquittal, the defendant admits the facts in evidence and admits every conclusion favorable to the State which may be drawn from the facts.”
Establishes the standard for reviewing motions for judgment of acquittal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.L. was charged with battery. At the adjudicatory hearing, the victim testified that A.L. struck the first blow, initiating a fight. The trial judge …
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SILBERMAN, Judge.
A.L. appeals from his adjudication of delinquency and sentence. We affirm the adjudication but remand for correction of the sentence.
A.L. was charged with battery. At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial judge stated that he would place A.L. on community control and impose sanctions, and he directed A.L. “not to have any violent contact with the victim.” The written order placed A.L. on community control, ordered him to stay away from the victim, and ordered A.L. to write a letter of apology to the victim. The order did not specify the duration of community control.
A.L. raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. We disagree. In a motion for judgment of acquittal, the defendant admits the facts in evidence and admits every conclusion favorable to the State which may be drawn from the facts. Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974). If there is a conflict in the facts and different conclusions may reasonably be drawn, the conflict should be resolved by the fact finder. Id.
Here, the victim testified that A.L. struck the first blow, initiating a fight. In support of his motion for judgment of acquittal, A.L. argued that the incident was one of mutual combat. Because there was sufficient evidence of guilt at the close of the State’s case and after the defense rested, the trial court properly denied the motion. See Leonard v. State, 731 So. 2d 712, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
Next, A.L. argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him for an indefinite time period. We agree. Under section 985.231(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), a delinquent child may be committed for an indeterminate amount of time, but this time “may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that an adult may serve for the same offense.” A.L. was convicted of battery, a first degree misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment. §§ 784.03(1), 775.082(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). Thus, we must remand for imposition of a proper sentence with the commitment not to exceed one year. See T.R.G. v. State, 697 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Finally, A.L. argues that the oral pronouncement and the written judgment do not conform due to the requirement in the written order that A.L. write a letter of apology to the victim. We agree. Since the letter of apology was not in the oral pronouncement, it must be stricken from the written judgment. Murph v. State, 666 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); A.R. v. State, 504 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication of delinquency but remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a new disposition order that places A.L. on community control for a period of no more than one year and that deletes the requirement of a letter of apology.
PATTERSON, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., concur.
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N.C. v. Anderson, 882 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2004)…0, Florida's Legislature amended section 985.231 (l)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, and substituted the term "conditional release” for the term "aftercare.” See ch.2000-135, § 31, Laws of Fla. . The Fourth District certified conflict with: A.L. v. State, 790 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that a written provision requiring that A.L. write a letter of apology to the victim be stricken from the written judgment because it was not included in the oral pronouncement); S.D.W. v. State, 746 So. 2d 1232, 12…
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Sutton v. State, 834 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…, a defendant admits not only the facts stated in the evidence, but also every reasonable conclusion favorable to the state that the trier of fact might fairly infer from the evidence. Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1974); Espiet; A.L. v. State, 790 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). It is the trial judge’s duty to review the evidence to determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the trier of fact could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences. A.L. “If, after vi…
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Isenhour v. State, 952 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…, a defendant admits not only the facts stated in the evidence, but also every reasonable conclusion favorable to the state that the trier of fact might fairly infer from the evidence. Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1974); Espiet; A.L. v. State, 790 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). It is the trial judge’s duty to review the evidence to determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the trier of fact could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences. A.L. “If, after vi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974)
- Dunbar v. State, 731 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- T.R.G. v. State, 697 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Timonere v. State, 666 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Thompson v. State, 666 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- A.R. v. State, 504 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Williams v. In the Interest of W.T., 504 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)