WILLIAM W. JESSEE, APPELLANT,
v.
CATHERINE JESSEE, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of the marital home to the former wife as lump sum alimony, finding such an award constituted an abuse of discretion where it resulted in a 97-3% distribution of marital assets with no legal justification.
The court held that the award of the marital home constituted an abuse of discretion because, under the circumstances, it created an inequitable distribution of marital property without sufficient legal justification. The court reversed this portion of the judgment and remanded for the trial court to award the former wife exclusive use and possession of the home until the children reach majority or she remarries, at which time it should be sold and proceeds equally divided.
[1] An award of the marital home as lump sum alimony constitutes an abuse of discretion where the circumstances show no necessity nor legal justification.
[2] A trial court's imputation of income to a party who intentionally avoided financial obligations may not additionally support an award of lump sum alimony.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where the circumstances show no necessity nor legal justification, a distribution of marital property that creates such an inequitable impact constitutes an abuse of discretion.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating whether unequal distribution of marital assets constitutes an abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for nineteen years and have three minor children. Their principal asset is a marital residence with approximately $55,000 in …
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PER CURIAM.
The former husband William J. Jessee appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, contending inter alia that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the former wife Catherine J. Jessee the marital home as lump sum alimony. We agree with the former husband that, under the circumstances of this case, the award of the marital home to the former wife was an abuse of discretion.
The parties were married for nineteen years and have three minor children. Their principal asset is the marital residence which has an equity of approximately $55,000. Although throughout the marriage, she mostly stayed at home with the children, at the time of the trial, the then 43 year old former wife was employed full time as a secretary earning $1,356 per month. The 44 year old former husband had most recently been employed as a construction manager earning $5,500 a month.
At trial, however, he testified that he was fired from his job because he had not brought his last construction job in on time.
The trial court imputed his prior income to the former husband, and, using this figure, ordered the former husband to pay the former wife $1,000 per month in permanent alimony and $1,582 per month in child support until the children reached the age of majority, with the understanding that as each child reached majority the former husband’s share of the child support would be converted to alimony until the wife reached $2,000 per month in alimony.1 In addition to the permanent alimony, the trial court awarded the parties’ marital residence to the former wife. This results in an unequal distribution of the parties’ marital assets (97% to the former wife and 3% to the former husband).
Where the circumstances show no necessity nor legal justification, a distribution of marital property that creates such an inequitable impact constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Porzio v. Porzio, 760 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Bible v. Bible, 597 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Klinger v. Klinger, 570 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Savage v. Savage, 556 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Satanonchai v. Satanonchai, 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
The sole justification given for the award of the lump sum alimony was “the Husband’s intentional attempt to avoid financial obligations by intentionally putting himself in a position to be terminated.” R.
123.
However, this fact was taken into consideration in imputing income to the former husband and in awarding permanent periodic alimony to the former wife. It cannot additionally support the award of lump sum alimony herein.
For the foregoing reasons, that portion of the final judgment of dissolution which awarded the former wife the marital home is hereby reversed. Finding no merit in the former husband’s remaining points on appeal, all other awards are affirmed. On remand, the trial court should award the former wife exclusive use and possession of the home until the children reach majority or she remarries, at which time the home should be sold and the proceeds equally divided between the parties. The trial court may also make such other rulings as are appropriate with regard to payment of the mortgage, taxes, insurance and other expenses of the property.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
. The husband was further ordered to keep in force a $500,000 life insurance policy naming the wife as the beneficiary, to continue providing medical insurance for his children through his employer, and to pay 68% of the children's college prepaid plan.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Rosario v. Rosario, 945 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…tances which would require a non-modifiable award of support. Glazner, 693 So. 2d at 652. These findings of special circumstances must be something above and beyond the justifications for an award of permanent periodic alimony. See Jessee v. Jessee, 839 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Here, the trial court found that the parties’ fourteen-year marriage fell within the gray area for purposes of determining alimony. Although the trial court made general findings sufficient to justify periodic alimony, it d…
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Lule v. Lule, 60 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ors listed in section 61.08(2) either. “Where the circumstances show no necessity nor legal justification, a distribution of marital property that creates such an inequitable impact constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Jessee v. Jessee, 839 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). While we are unable to review the propriety of the lump sum award of the marital home to the wife based on the husband’s apparent infidelity without a valuation, we note that this court has previously reversed an award of t…
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Horacio A. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 958 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…ow, on the supposition that there would be at most nominal periodic alimony.) Compare Rosario v. Rosario, 945 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)(reversing award of marital home), Perez v. Perez, 882 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(same), Jessee v. Jessee, 839 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(same), and Safferstone v. Safferstone, 501 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(same), with Bressler v. Bressler, 914 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(upholding award of marital home), Russell v. Russell, 890 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 200…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pundik v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 597 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Savage v. Savage, 556 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Graham v. State, 760 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Editorial Cernuda, Inc. v. Editorial Am., S.A., 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Blue Satanonchai v. Amparo Satanonchai, 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Porzio v. Porzio, 760 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Klinger v. Klinger, 570 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)