MAURICE LAWSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Maurice Lawson appeals a probation revocation order based on his termination from sex offender counseling. The court reverses, finding insufficient evidence of a willful and substantial violation of probation where the probation order did not require successful completion on the first attempt.
The court reversed the revocation order because the evidence was insufficient to show a willful and substantial violation of probation. The probation order did not specify that treatment had to be successfully completed on the first try or how many opportunities the probationer would be given to complete it.
[1] A probationer's early termination from a treatment program, without more, may be insufficient evidence to establish a willful and substantial violation of probation.
[2] A probation order that does not specify the number of chances a probationer has to successfully complete a treatment program does not mandate termination upon the first u…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the evidence was insufficient to show a willful and substantial violation of probation”
Establishes the standard and basis for reversal in probation violation cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLawson was required under special condition 17 of his probation to attend and complete outpatient sex offender counseling. He was terminated from Dr. …
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[*350] FULMER, Judge.
Maurice Lawson appeals from an order revoking his probation. We reverse because the evidence was insufficient to show a willful and substantial violation of probation.
Lawson was charged with violating special condition 17, which provides: “You shall attend and complete out-patient sex offender counseling during probationary period.” The affidavit of violation of probation alleged that Lawson:
was unsuccessfully terminated from Sex Offender Counseling as a result of ... ongoing poor community adjustment, his slow progress in working on therapeutic assignments and his failure to either pay for his counseling or do community service hours for his counseling, as verified by a letter from Dr. Leo Cotter, his Sex Offender Therapist.
At the hearing on the violation, the probation officer testified that Lawson’s probation was scheduled to terminate on June 30, 2005. Lawson was violated due to a letter from Dr. Cotter dated February 27, 2002, indicating that Lawson was terminated from sex offender counseling. Dr. Cotter, director of the SHARE program, which is a private sexual abuse treatment program, testified that he could not get Lawson to focus and settle down and that Lawson was terminated from the program because he put forth a high risk for reof-fending.
Lawson had a near perfect attendance record in Dr. Cotter’s weekly group treatment program from his start in July 2000 until his termination in February 2002. Lawson testified that he wished to resume treatment and had worked on treatment assignments while he was in jail on his violation of probation. Dr. Cotter testified that he would accept Lawson back into treatment if his attitude improved.
In similar cases, where a probationer was terminated from a treatment program early, the evidence has been considered insufficient to show a willful and substantial violation. See Bennett v. State, 684 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Cowart v. State, 754 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Gibbs v. State, 609 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). It is also noteworthy that the probation order in this case did not specify that treatment had to be successfully completed on the first try or how many chances the probationer would be given to successfully complete it. See Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Dunkin v. State, 780 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Young. We, therefore, reverse and remand for the trial court to reinstate the probation.
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA, J, and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Dwaine Woodson v. State, 864 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…ion as a viable alternative to incarceration. Accordingly, Woodson’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. We certify that our decision conflicts with Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and note possible conflict with Lawson v. State, 845 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). AFFIRM. PLEUS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. . The scoresheet indicates that Woodson scored a minimum of 144.4 months' incarceration in the Department of Corrections and that…
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Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ities the trial court would permit him to comply with this condition. Likewise, the sentencing court failed to designate a time period for completion of the task. Thus, the order suffered from the same infirmity as that described in Lawson v. State, 845 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), where this court observed that “the probation order in this case did not specify the treatment had to be successfully completed on the first try or how many chances the probationer would be given to successfully complete it.…1 / 2
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Wilkerson v. State, 884 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…of probation when the probation order does not require completion within a specified period of time and sufficient time remains for the defendant to complete the program. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 862 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Lawson v. State, 845 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Although Wilkerson was twice discharged from his treatment program, the State did not establish that he was either unwilling or unable to complete the program during his probati…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Young v. State, 566 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Ricci M. Salzano v. State, 664 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Lashon Grant v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Lynom v. State, 816 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Gibbs v. State, 609 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Bennett v. State, 684 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Dunkin v. State, 780 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Cowart v. State, 754 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)