GAYLE VALDEZ, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Gayle Valdez challenged a trial court order disqualifying her attorney due to a conflict of interest arising from the attorney's dual representation of Valdez and a co-defendant who might testify against her. The appellate court granted her petition, holding that once the defendant was fully informed of the potential conflict and knowingly waived it, disqualification was improper.
A defendant cannot be disqualified from her chosen counsel when she has been fully informed of a potential conflict of interest and has knowingly waived that conflict. Although a conflict of interest might develop, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of her choice must be weighed against the potential conflict, and an affirmative knowing waiver precludes disqualification.
[1] A defendant has a presumptive right to proceed with counsel of their choosing under the Sixth Amendment.
[2] A defendant's right to counsel of choice must be weighed against the possibility of a conflict of interest.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a presumptive right to proceed with counsel of his or her choosing under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional principle underlying the court's analysis
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceValdez and a co-defendant were arrested together and charged with drug trafficking offenses. They were living together and retained the same attorney.…
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PALMER, J.
Gayle Valdez (defendant) has filed a petition seeking certiorari review of an order entered by the trial court disqualifying her trial counsel. Concluding that the defendant was fully informed of the potential conflict of interest and knowingly waived that conflict, we grant the petition and quash the disqualification order. The defendant was charged with trafficking in contraband. A co-defendant was also arrested and charged with possession of contraband. The defendants were living together at the time of their arrest, and they retained the same attorney to represent them.
The State moved to disqualify the defendant’s trial counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest due to the fact that the co-defendant would be called at trial to testify against the defendant. At the hearing on the motion, the arresting officer testified that the co-defendant stated that the defendant was responsible for dealing in narcotics. However, the co-defendant testified that he did not make any statement which implicated the defendant. The defendant indicated that she wanted her lawyer to continue to represent her. The trial court granted the State’s motion, finding that a serious potential conflict existed due to defense counsel’s dual representation, and further finding the conflict to be so potentially fundamental as to negate the defendant’s waiver. We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in order ing disqualification and, therefore, we grant the defendant’s petition and quash the disqualification order. A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a presumptive right to proceed with counsel of his or her choosing under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); Robinson v. State, 750 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In Woseley v. State, 590 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) the First District explained:
In a criminal case, the existence of a conflict of interest is not determinative because the defendant has a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel of his choice.
Id. at 980 (citing DeArce v. State, 405 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)); see also Barclay v. Wainwright, 444 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1984); Roberts v. State, 573 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
Here, although a conflict of interest might develop between the defendant and the co-defendant, that possibility must be weighed against the defendant’s right to proceed with counsel of her own choosing. The defendant made an affirmative waiver of any conflict at the hearing. Once she was fully informed of the potential conflict of interest and knowingly waived that conflict, disqualification of counsel was unwarranted.
Petition GRANTED, order QUASHED and case REMANDED.
SHARP, W, and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1988)
- Elwood C. Barclay v. Louie L, 444 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1984)
- DeARCE v. State, 405 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Roberts v. State, 573 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Robinson v. State, 750 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Josiah E. Burden and Clarissa I. Burden v. Northside Dodge, Inc., 590 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Llewellyn P. Woseley and Cynthia K. Madison v. State, 590 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)