ALEXANDER EDISON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the State failed to prove the defendant's qualifying prior felony convictions were sequentially and separately obtained, thus reversing the habitual felony offender sentence.
[1] To qualify for habitual felony offender sentencing, the State must prove that prior felony convictions were sentenced separately from the current offense and any other pr…
[2] Sentences for separate prior felony convictions for unrelated crimes may occur on the same day, but cannot be entered as part of the same sentencing proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlexander Edison was sentenced as a habitual felony offender for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The State presented evidence of four pr…
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STRINGER, Judge.
Alexander Edison seeks review of his habitual felony offender (“HFO”) sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We reverse Edison’s HFO sentence because the State failed to prove that Edison’s qualifying convictions were sequentially and separately obtained.
In order to qualify as a prior felony for HFO sentencing, the prior felony conviction must have been sentenced separately from the current offense and any other prior felony convictions. § 775.084(5), Fla. Stat. (2000). Under section 775.084(5), the sentencing for separate prior felony convictions for unrelated crimes can occur on the same day, but the sentences cannot be entered as part of the same sentencing proceeding. Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Fla.2001). It is the State’s burden to prove that a defendant qualifies as an HFO. Wainer v. State, 798 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
In this case, the State presented evidence that Edison was adjudicated guilty of four prior felonies on October 22, 1997, which was prior to the sentencing hearing. Although each felony had a different case number, the record does not establish that the sentences were entered as part of different sentencing proceedings. In fact, from the transcript of an October 22, 1997, sentencing hearing contained in the record, it appears that the charges in one case resulted in three violations of probation at the same sentencing proceeding. Although Edison did not object to his HFO sentence during sentencing, he has preserved the issue for review by filing a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).
Because the record does not establish that the qualifying convictions were sentenced separately, the State has not met its burden of proving that Edison qualified as an HFO. Accordingly, we reverse. On remand, the State may again seek HFO treatment, if applicable. Tyler v. State, 826 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); May v. State, 713 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
Reversed and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.
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Erick Richardson v. State, 884 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…s “senténcing” for purposes of this section.1 This court has not directly addressed this issue before, but several cases seem to implicitly recognize this conclusion. See Ford v. State, 814 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also Edison v. State, 848 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); May v. State, 713 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). But see Render v. State, 742 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We acknowledge that revocation of probation requires adjudication of guilt. See § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). This d…
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Brown v. State, 113 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…posed as a result of a prior conviction of a felony or other qualified offense” — appears in section 775.084(l)(a)2.b. The State had the burden to provide record evidence of Brown’s eligibility for HFO classification and sentencing. Edison v. State, 848 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Boyd v. State, 776 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reversing and remanding for resen-tencing, where the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant’s release date from prison). Analysis The parties agree it is revers…
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Ridley v. State, 911 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…er must be remanded because the predicate offenses used to ha-bitualize Ridley appear to have been obtained at the same sentencing hearing and, thus, could not serve as the basis for his sentencing as a habitual felony offender. See Edison v. State, 848 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Ridley’s sentences were the result of a negotiated plea which included the understanding that he would be sentenced as a habitual felony offender on the charges which were subject to habitualiza [*218] tion, and at the sentencing…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2001)
- Wainer v. State, 798 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- MAY v. State, 713 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Hugh v. State, 826 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Ekow Tyler v. State, 826 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)