MICHAEL SCOTT KROHN, APPELLANT,
v.
BRITTANY LAUREN FOSTER, APPELLEE
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The court reversed an order modifying the appellant's visitation rights because the record contained no evidence of a substantial or material change in circumstances or that modification would serve the child's best interest.
A modification of visitation rights requires evidence of a substantial or material change in circumstances since the prior order and that modification promotes the child's best interest.
[1] A party seeking modification of custody or visitation must establish a substantial or material change in circumstances since the prior order and that modification will pr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant sought review of an order modifying his visitation rights with his minor daughter. The modification was entered without the issue being …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of an order modifying his visitation rights with his minor daughter. He argues that the order con- statutes a denial of due process of law because visitation was neither raised as an issue by the pleadings nor tried by consent, and that the order is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that it contains no evidence sufficient to establish either a substantial or material change in circumstances since the entry of the final judgment which initially established Appellant’s visitation rights, or that changing Appellant’s visitation rights would be in the child’s best interest. See, e.g., Teta v. Teta, 297 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (when considering a petition for modification of custody or visitation, a court has less discretion than when entering an original decree; the party requesting the modification must establish that there has been a substantial or material change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order, and that modification will promote the best interest of the child); Perkins v. McKay, 460 So. 2d 581, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (same; citing Teta).
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the order which modifies Appellant’s visitation rights, and remand with directions to vacate that portion of the order and to reinstate the prior visitation provisions.
In light of this disposition, we find it unnecessary to address Appellant’s due process argument.
BOOTH, WEBSTER, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sidman v. Marino, 46 So. 3d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…tion of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule is in the best interests of the child and is based upon a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances. See Kelly v. Colston, 977 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Krohn v. Foster, 856 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although the evidence may have shown that increasing the father’s time with the child is in the child’s best interest, there was no evidence of an unanticipated and s…
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Zander Lewis Kelly v. Colston, 977 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…her orders subsequent to the voluntary dismissal are VACATED. POLSTON and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . Incidentally, the court's order modifying visitation failed to find the required substantial or material change in circumstances. See Krohn v. Foster, 856 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Henderson v. Henderson, 905 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Knipe v. Knipe, 840 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). . Rule 12.490(f) also permits the parties to file exceptions. At a minimum, submission requires the close…
Authorities Cited
- McCONNELL v. Brumos Porsche Audi Corp., 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Dina Teta v. Teta, 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Perkins v. McKAY, 460 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)